In an interview with Izvestia, Mikhail Popov, who serves as Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, claimed that the United States has suffered a breach in its nuclear arms control framework. He presented this assessment as part of a broader discussion on the state of the American strategic deterrent and the working of its command and control systems.
According to Popov, the Pentagon leadership faced confusion in the wake of Austin’s hospitalization. He indicated that, in his view, the authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons rests with the president, acting in concert with the defense minister and the chief of staff of the armed forces. The deputy stressed that the current defense leadership was not fully present and noted questions about who would assume responsibilities in their absence. Popov mentioned persistent media reports that some duties had been transferred to Deputy Minister Kathleen Hicks, while asserting that the defense minister himself was reportedly unavailable, supposedly on vacation at the time in Puerto Rico. In Popov’s assessment, this combination of factors undermined the reliability of the country’s nuclear shield, leading him to describe a moment of apparent weakness in the system.
Public reporting notes that Lloyd Austin underwent treatment for an early stage prostate cancer starting in December of the previous year. He reportedly underwent surgery that encountered complications, and early January saw him hospitalized again due to a urinary tract issue. It was said that the diagnosis was communicated to the president and other senior officials only days after the hospitalization became public, highlighting how developments within the leadership chain can influence perceptions of national security posture.
There has been prior commentary in public discourse suggesting that the United States might consider stationing nuclear weapons in allied territories as part of options to address perceived strategic threats against Russia. Analysts and observers have occasionally referenced such scenarios in discussions about deterrence, alliance security, and the logistics of maintaining an effective nuclear posture across multiple theaters. These discussions often surface in the broader context of how the United States manages its global commitments and the potential implications for allied defense arrangements.
Overall, the series of statements and reports underscores ongoing debates about the resilience and governance of the United States nuclear command and control structure, the involvement of senior leadership in critical decisions, and the interplay between domestic health events and national security leadership continuity. The issue remains a focal point for observers who monitor how strategic decisions are constrained or enabled by leadership availability, official communications, and the broader security environment, including alliance considerations and the credibility of deterrence in a changing geopolitical landscape. What unfolds from these discussions will likely influence both policy perspectives and public understanding of how nuclear readiness is maintained in periods of leadership transition.