Analysts from the American edition of The National Interest evaluated the Virginia‑class submarines of the United States against the Yasen class of submarines from Russia, both regarded as leading rivals within their segment. They weighed the strengths and weaknesses of these nuclear-powered vessels and concluded that the United States had ceded some oceanic dominance. This assessment comes despite the United States fielding 19 Virginia boats, with the first, Virginia, SSN‑774, entering service in 2004. In contrast, Russia’s Project 885 and 885M have produced only three ships so far: K‑560 Severodvinsk, K‑561 Kazan, and K‑573 Novosibirsk, with six more of the same family expected to be commissioned by 2028.
One key edge claimed for the Yasen‑M project’s submarines over the Virginia class lies in onboard payload capacity. The Novosibirsk, for instance, carries eight silo launchers, each capable of housing four Onyx, Zircon, or five smaller cruise missiles. In addition, it features ten 533 mm torpedo tubes and a complement of thirty torpedoes compatible with those tubes. By comparison, American Virginias are equipped with four torpedo tubes carrying twenty-six torpedoes and twelve missile launchers for Tomahawk cruise missiles, restricting salvo options relative to their Russian counterparts.
Neither submarine class is silent by accident; both are valued for their stealth. The American submarines are widely regarded as highly advanced, while manufacturers and engineers at Sevmash do not necessarily share that view, describing their own product as a “submarine cruiser of the twenty‑first century.” Although both submarines are multi‑mission platforms, the Virginia boats are primarily oriented toward anti‑submarine warfare and special operations support, whereas the Yasen designs emphasize striking enemy surface ships and targeting ground objectives with a range of cruise missiles.
With a volley of Onyx missiles traveling at speeds around Mach 2.6, a Yasen‑class submarine could threaten an opposing carrier group, especially when operating with surface escorts. The missiles can strike land targets up to approximately 800 kilometers away. The notable combat use of such missiles has been documented in Syria in November 2016, when Onyx and similar systems were deployed via the Bastion‑P coastal defense network. During the ongoing operations in Ukraine, Onyx attacks have been recorded as well against Ukrainian military facilities.
In contrast, the broader use of weapons like Caliber missiles with ranges up to 2500 kilometers or Zircon missiles around 1000 kilometers by Russian submarines has not been publicly observed in extensive naval combat. Those capabilities have predominantly remained the domain of Russian diesel‑electric submarines from the Varshavyanka class, which carry Caliber cruise missiles.
Some observers describe the Russian nuclear submarine force as a de facto second front in broader regional conflicts. Official statements suggest that these boats are not always directly engaged in hostilities, yet they are kept on high readiness within deterrence forces. The political leaders of both nations have acknowledged the strategic significance of undersea power, recognizing its potential to shape global military calculations.
Beyond the Yasen‑M project, Russia maintains a varied submarine portfolio including Borey, Shark, Pike‑B and other designs actively in service. The Belgorod submarine, equipped with Poseidon unmanned underwater weapons, has reportedly been shielded from enemy radar. Analysts contend that Kazan and Novosibirsk, as representatives of the 885M class, may be outfitted with hypersonic Zircon missiles, suggesting capabilities that could challenge a wide array of targets, including high‑value decision centers in distant regions. Such assessments underscore the strategic significance of the submarine fleet for Russia and the potential impact on American planning and budgeting.
Project 885M submarines remain shrouded in a degree of secrecy. Details about the propulsion system and certain performance characteristics, such as submerged speed which can exceed 31 knots, are not publicly disclosed. The long‑lasting underwater endurance of these vessels, reportedly up to one hundred days of autonomous operation, demonstrates the potential for extended missions without resurfacing while remaining stealthy against radar surveillance systems.
Experts note that the Yasen‑M program and related renovations to the submarine fleet mark a substantial showing of capability for the Russian navy. They emphasize the lasting influence these vessels may have on future naval development and deterrence strategies. In parallel, ongoing modernization efforts in other projects, including Borey‑M and Lada variants, as well as new diesel‑electric platforms, indicate a continuous strengthening of the overall undersea force. The broader implication, according to multiple observers, is that Russian submarine forces have regained a commanding footing in maritime power projection and will likely shape naval planning for years to come.