In April, Kyiv requested that Washington supply MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, and by early June, the Biden administration included four such drones in the broader aid package for Ukraine’s armed forces.
Reuters noted that the move was preliminary and contingent on congressional and Defense Department approval. American observers suggested that the Pentagon initially blocked the transmission, underscoring the political and procedural hurdles involved in delivering advanced weaponry to Ukraine.
One major hurdle, cited by defense analysts, is the Missile Technology Control Regime governing US drone exports. A second concern concerns the potential risk that the Gray Eagle’s sophisticated systems could fall into adversary hands if the aircraft were captured or damaged. Sergey Belousov, a member of the College of Military Experts, told Gazeta that beyond the missiles, these UAVs carry radar and surveillance equipment that could be misused if seized by Russia, highlighting the strategic stakes involved in such transfers.
The MQ-1C Gray Eagle is outfitted with the AN/ZPY-1 STARlite tactical radar, a system developed under the auspices of the US Army Communications and Electronics Command. It entered service in 2012 and remains partly classified. The UAV’s avionics suite includes the third‑generation AN/AAS-53 optoelectronic system, which supports surveillance, tracking, and target designation for Hellfire missiles.
Belousov warned that the United States fears not only the disclosure of technical details but also the possibility of adversaries exploiting communication links that control reconnaissance and strike capabilities. He noted that Russia could potentially exploit gaps if critical information were compromised, which is central to the ongoing risk assessment surrounding these platforms.
Reuters also indicated that Gray Eagle technologies might be replicated for illicit purposes or that individual components could be repurposed or copied in part, raising concerns about the integrity of high‑end defense technology in the hands of foreign actors.
Historical analogies are often drawn to illustrate the potential dangers. Critics point out that Iran’s drone program has shown that American designs can influence other fleets when intelligence gaps and capture opportunities arise. The Shahed-129 attack aircraft bears a strong resemblance to the Predator family, and Iran has likewise integrated elements from other U.S. drones such as the ScanEagle and the RQ-170 Sentinel into its own catalog of unmanned systems.
Roman Gusarov, editor of Avia.Ru, commented that public assertions about Russia stealing U.S. drone technology to undercut Western industries are not supported by real production capacity within Russia. He argued that Moscow is more apt to seek Western technology when it serves strategic interests, but that it does not need a full import substitution model to justify or enable such acquisitions. He suggested that American fears about the operational reliability of their equipment in real combat situations may influence the cautious stance toward sending cutting‑edge drones to conflict zones, where the technology would confront modern air defenses and electronic warfare systems. In his view, this reduces the likelihood of deploying only older or lighter weapons to Ukraine.
Gusarov emphasized that if an American drone experiences a serious crash, the primary value lies in studying its systems to understand how the vehicle recognizes friend from foe, a critical component for any modern combat system. He argued that this capability is a key reason behind persistent concerns about sharing such technology. He also noted that Russia’s defense ministry has its own criteria for evaluating hardware, diminishing the need for direct imports, duplications, or rapid substitutions from this series of drones.