In the late stages of World War II, archival materials recovered and assessed by Russian security services indicate that Adolf Hitler entertained the possibility of deploying a nuclear weapon against the Soviet Union in mid-1945. This interpretation comes from declassified files released by the Federal Security Service, the successor organization to the Soviet-era security apparatus. The documents describe a wartime scenario in which the German regime weighed drastic measures if the conflict persisted into the summer of 1945, including the prospect of a nuclear strike and the potential implications for the eastern front.
Among the items cited by the archives is a note dated September 14, 1945, certain to intrigue historians. It records a communication from the head of the operational sector of Berlin’s NKVD, Major General Alexei Sidnev, addressed to the Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Colonel General Ivan Serov. The message concerns the ongoing inquiry into activities linked to SA Gruppenführer Werner Wächter, a figure connected to German military and propaganda leadership. The transfer of this information illustrates how Soviet investigators tracked extremist networks and their plans, even as the war drew to a close.
Declassified interrogations reveal Wächter’s dual role within the Third Reich. He is described not only as the chief of staff for the Main Propaganda Directorate of the Nazi Party but also as someone who oversaw a broader project on armaments and construction. This auxiliary responsibility involved compiling and evaluating proposals for breakthrough weapons, with an eye toward testing new concepts and assessing their potential military impact. In the context of the era, such efforts reflected a broader ambition within the Nazi machinery to secure an edge through innovation, even as the regime faced imminent defeat.
From the interrogation records, readers encounter a provocative claim about a plan to bombard the Urals with a so‑called miracle weapon—the atomic bomb. The documents suggest that Wächter discussed such a weapon’s feasibility and its potential use against the Soviet Union. Yet they also raise questions about the reliability of his testimony. Notably, Wächter’s proximity to key state secrets remains unclear, which adds a layer of caution for modern readers examining the reliability and scope of the allegations reported in these files.
For those seeking a deeper understanding, additional context and analysis are available in independent summaries and reconstructions of the declassified materials. These sources discuss how the Allies and the Soviet Union monitored and interpreted German efforts in armaments and propaganda, and why certain plans may have remained theoretical rather than practical. The broader narrative emphasizes the tension between wartime propaganda aims and the realities of industrial capability as the war approached its end, a topic that continues to provoke reflection among scholars of international security and 20th‑century history. [Attribution: declassified archival materials from a national security archive and subsequent scholarly summaries.]
Historically, researchers view the cited testimonies as part of a larger pattern: the Nazi regime’s relentless push to innovate under pressure, paired with a propagandistic narrative designed to reshape enemy perceptions. The available records illustrate how investigators pieced together fragments from interrogations, communications, and organizational roles to reconstruct events that may never have fully materialized on the battlefield. They also underscore the challenges historians face when evaluating wartime claims made under duress and during tumultuous periods of political upheaval. [Attribution: declassified archival materials from a national security archive and subsequent scholarly summaries.]