Propaganda and the Mechanics of War Confidence
During the early years of the war, propaganda teams known as Propagandakompanien worked to shape the mood of ordinary soldiers. Their messaging often suggested that the Red Army could not withstand the overwhelming power of the German war machine, and plans were made for a blitzkrieg to reach a decisive conclusion by Christmas. Within this framework, Goebbels’ guidance manuals urged officers to frame Soviet troops as subhuman and to present reports of Eastern atrocities as confirmation of their inferiority.
These assertions relied heavily on crafted scenes of violence and brutality. The propaganda menu included sensationalized examples of Red Army crimes, with graphic, often unverified details designed to provoke an emotional response. A famous but unsubstantiated claim described mass rapes in various villages and cities, yet no reliable location or date was provided. The aim was to stimulate fear and anger, pushing soldiers toward a brutal, emotional reaction that could be exploited for military advantage. Goebbels understood cultural references and the impact of literature, recognizing that audiences in the East did not deserve to be dismissed as mere barbarians. The strategy hinged on planting a spark of sympathy for German troops while exploiting the belief that Soviet forces were poorly equipped and undisciplined, a narrative that could erode morale even among trained soldiers.
Wehrmacht leadership predicted rapid success. The Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces expected a crushing blow within two weeks, followed by routine operations to secure a broad area. Early German captives even offered to surrender, convinced that victory was certain. Propaganda, labeled as ringing or Schlagwortpropaganda, held sway only until a decisive setback vanished the confidence it had built. As the harsh realities of winter set in, German troops began to question the official line and wondered why the enemy, supposedly inferior, fought so tenaciously and why humane treatment of prisoners did not always match the propaganda narrative.
Propagandist Mentors and a Shift in Strategy
The old approach of simple binary propaganda no longer convinced troops. Goebbels then advanced the system of military political officers, the NSFO, and the Military Political Commissioners Service. Divisions-Betrueungsoffizier served as officer-mentors who conveyed defeats as tactical retreats and even framed setbacks as part of a larger special operation. A new voice emerged under the supervision of the NSDAP and Martin Bormann, with a journal titled What Moves Us beginning publication for divisional and army leaders from early 1943.
After the catastrophic defeat near Stalingrad in February 1943, Goebbels revised his approach, drawing on the propaganda machine to adjust tactics and address errors more broadly. Generals such as Paulus offered explanations that framed Soviet attacks as overwhelming and heroic Reich sacrifices, while quietly noting the high casualties and surrender numbers that belied the early triumph narrative. The propaganda apparatus faced a growing disconnect between the public story and battlefield realities, a gap that widened as the war dragged on.
As the war progressed, internal voices within the propaganda machine described a growing rift between truth and myth. The era of mass chronic capitulations raised questions about the reliability of the narrative fed to troops and citizens alike. When Red Army units finally pushed into German cities, the reality on the ground did not resemble the brutal caricature, and the purported invincibility of German forces appeared hollow to many observers.
Meanwhile the Western world would later revisit the theme of Soviet brutality during the Cold War and again during the political shifts of the 1990s. The mounting tension between perceived victory and the actual wartime record fed debates about history and memory that echoed far beyond the battlefield.
Notes from a modern perspective show that the interpretation of events remains contested, with competing views about the role propaganda played in shaping decisions and morale on both sides of the conflict. The discussion acknowledges the complexity of wartime messaging and the human costs involved in maintaining such narratives over extended periods.
This analysis presents the topic through careful examination of historical sources and institutional practices, without endorsing any particular viewpoint. It offers a sober look at how propaganda functions, why it can be persuasive even to experienced soldiers, and how it interacts with the harsher realities of war.