Finland and Russia share a border spanning 1,271 kilometers, with 1,091 kilometers of that being land. From Vyborg, Russia, the distance to the nearest Finnish city, Lappenranta, is about 65 kilometers. Sweden, beyond access through the Baltic, has no direct land border with Russia, but it does connect to the Kaliningrad region via sea routes.
If Finland and Sweden are admitted to NATO, observers expect only modest changes in overall strength. The Stockholm defense system comprises roughly 30,000 personnel across land, sea, and air branches. The army is projected to grow into six motorized brigades and an infantry division in the future. It fields 120 Leopard tanks, 340 Strf 9040 infantry fighting vehicles, and 48 Archer self-propelled 155 mm howitzers. The air arm includes JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighters and Italian-made AW109 attack helicopters. The navy operates five diesel-electric submarines and nine corvettes.
The Finnish Army, formally the Finnish Defence Forces, remains relatively compact. It consists of about 12,000 professional soldiers and 22,000 conscripts. Germany supplies Leopard tanks, with around 100 active and 100 in storage. The air fleet features American F-18s and British Hawk attack aircraft. The Finnish navy centers on mine warfare and patrol vessels, totaling around 30 units, with the most recent vessel delivered in 2006.
According to Major General Alexander Vladimirov, head of the Military Experts College, in an interview with Gazeta.ru, the current force composition of Finland and Sweden cannot be directly compared to the Russian military. He notes that Stockholm and Helsinki joined NATO under pressure and would likely avoid armed confrontation with Russia. He adds that the alliance’s presence would bring significant consequences, urging a shift from peacetime to wartime posture and a broader buildup of defenses.
Another analyst, Vladislav Shurygin, offered a similar view in an interview with socialbites.ca. He argues that Finland and Sweden’s accession would barely alter regional power balances. The Baltic and Northern Fleets, plus a robust group in the Kaliningrad region and the Western Military District, already shape the region. He highlights the potential deployment of American missile defenses on Finnish and Swedish soil as a provocative signal to Russia. He suggests that neither country would gain security through NATO alone and that a heightened threat would necessitate readiness.
In contrast, Rear Admiral Viktor Borisov questions the strategic aim behind Finland and Sweden joining NATO. He believes the move is aimed at competing with Russia in the Arctic region along the path of the Northern Sea Route. He notes that NATO’s influence there would be extended through American air power, even though Finland and Sweden lack direct Arctic Ocean access. Under current agreements, the United States has established several airstrips and bases in the area, expanding air coverage along Arctic routes. Washington appears intent on widening its footprint in the north despite potential pushback from Moscow.
According to Borisov, the Arctic becomes a crucial front in future competitions. Finnish and Swedish air bases could serve as launchpoints for American operations, enabling closer observation of Arctic fleets and resources. The Arctic remains a focal point for security interests as vast natural reserves attract attention, and NATO’s presence in the north is seen as a strategic lever by some analysts. The broader question remains: how far will alliance expansion influence regional stability and the balance of power in the 21st century? The answers depend on the evolving security environment, alliance decisions, and the responses from Moscow. This analysis underscores the complexity of northern European security and the high stakes involved for all actors in the region (Attribution: military observers and regional analysts).