Liu Xiaoming, serving as China’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, has raised strong cautions about what he describes as a widening role of the United States in nuclear weapons issues across Asia. He underscored that Washington and London have allegedly provided nuclear submarines to Australia, a move he characterizes as a core instance of nuclear proliferation. He warned that such steps destabilize the region and position the United States as a persistent obstacle to regional peace and security, according to his assessment reported by TASS.
In his view, Washington has publicly signaled an intent to construct a strategic perimeter around the People’s Republic of China. He cited the United States’ stated Indo-Pacific strategy, which frames goals of openness and freedom, but according to his interpretation, these aims are actually designed to assemble a coalition of small groups and specialized formats that seek to constrain China’s development. This framing, he argues, is a mechanism to isolate Beijing rather than foster genuine regional stability, as described in the same briefing from TASS.
The discourse also touched on remarks attributed to former United States President Joe Biden regarding the AUKUS security arrangement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Biden affirmed a path for Australia to maintain its status as a non-nuclear state while engaging with U.S. submarine capabilities. He stated that the submarines Australia would acquire from the United States would rely on nuclear propulsion for performance but would not be equipped to carry nuclear weapons, a distinction he framed as a commitment to nonproliferation even within a broader defense partnership, according to the coverage from TASS.
Observers in international policy circles note that the AUKUS pact signals a significant shift in the regional security architecture, aligning allied capabilities to deter potential threats in the Indo-Pacific. China’s top envoy has framed these developments as a strategic attempt to place the region under external influence, warning that such moves could escalate strategic competition. The statements from Liu Xiaoming emphasize a recurring theme in Beijing’s public diplomacy: the belief that Western security architectures often present themselves as open and cooperative while advancing exclusive formats that limit China’s development. This tension forms a backdrop for ongoing diplomatic exchanges and strategic assessments in Washington, Canberra, London, and Beijing, as reported by TASS.
Another layer of this dialogue centers on how nuclear energy and nonproliferation norms intersect with alliance politics. While the United States has argued that nuclear propulsion is a matter of strategic necessity for long-range deterrence and power projection, Chinese officials insist that these moves should not translate into a broader capability for deploying nuclear weapons in new theaters. The debate touches on international law, regional diplomacy, and the practical realities of defense modernization among allied states. TASS has framed these discussions as part of a broader contest over influence in the Asia-Pacific, with implications for stability, economic ties, and regional trust.
For policymakers and analysts, the core issue remains the balance between strategic reassurance among allies and the potential risks associated with expanding nuclear-powered platforms. The dialogue highlights how statements about freedom of navigation and openness can coexist with strategic efforts to create exclusive security formats. As the region observes how the United States and its partners implement their submarine procurement plans, observers expect continued scrutiny from Beijing and other regional capitals. The evolving narrative will likely influence diplomatic engagements, regional confidence-building measures, and future arms-control conversations, all of which are essential to shaping a secure and predictable security environment in the Indo-Pacific, as reported by TASS.