In 1975, shortly after Franco’s death, Henry Kissinger sent a long telegram to Juan Carlos I. The five-page missive outlined how the new king should conduct himself and who should fill his circle of influence as Spain navigated a delicate transition.
“The guidance was thorough and pragmatic,” notes Charles Powell, director of the Elcano Royal Institute and author of Kissinger and Spain. He explains to this publication that Kissinger urged restraint and warned against rushing concessions, advising the king to choose only what was essential and to avoid elections until victory seemed certain. The message highlighted the importance of tapping demographic data to gauge public sentiment and to pace the democratic reforms accordingly. In the Spanish Transition, Kissinger’s role as the chief architect of American diplomacy was pivotal, with the aim of steering the process toward stability while maintaining strategic interests. The telegram underscored a cautious approach, including the potential exclusion of communism from the parliament to preserve its illegality and reduce friction during the transition, a stance Time would later frame as a factor in shaping a peaceful evolution in Spain.
Almighty Kisser
Henry Kissinger, born in Fürth, Germany in 1923, passed away this Thursday at the age of 100. He had served as a professor of History at Harvard and as National Security Advisor (1969-1975) and Foreign Minister (1973-1977) under presidents Nixon and Ford. The overlap of those two roles for the first time in history elevated him to a position of extraordinary influence, a de facto second president in the eyes of many observers.
His tenure included controversial actions, including bombings in Cambodia and support for coups in Chile and Argentina, which caused immense casualties. Despite these actions, Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in ending the Vietnam War. He is remembered for a realist approach to foreign policy that prioritized national interests and the use of force when deemed necessary.
Kissinger and the Spanish Crossing
Kissinger’s power coincided with the late Franco era and Spain’s transition to democracy. The question remains whether his influence helped or hindered the process. Powell notes that Kissinger had limited faith in the Spanish Transition and doubt about the capacity of Spaniards to govern themselves, shaped by a deep familiarity with European history and civil conflict. While he appreciated Spain’s culture, literature, and empire, he questioned the ability of the people to live together cohesively. Kissinger also offered a cautious view of the Franco regime’s charitable veneer, acknowledging its social and economic progress while remaining wary of its final trajectory.
Despite these reservations, Secretary of State Kissinger played a role in events that would later become pivotal. He helped orchestrate a 1976 visit of Juan Carlos I to address the United States Congress, where the king voiced support for democracy in Spain. The speech drew praise from major outlets such as the Washington Post and the New York Times. Upon returning to Spain, political shifts followed, including the dismissal of Navarro by President Arias and the rise of Adolfo Suárez, a moment recalled by Powell in his analysis of transatlantic relations.
Reduce Worker Commissions
The second half of the 20th century saw U.S.–Spain relations shaped by Franco-era military bases and the political leverage they offered Washington. By the early 1970s, these dynamics evolved from military deals into a broader political partnership. Kissinger visited Spain eight times between 1970 and 1976, driven in part by concerns about the reemergence of communism on the peninsula, a worry shared with fears evident in Italy and France. His distrust extended to both Spanish and Portuguese socialist parties, even as practical diplomacy continued.
Spain’s ambassador Wells Stabler emerged as a trusted adviser who could argue for stabilizing the process through a measured approach. Fluent in Spanish and well-connected with political actors, Stabler contended that supporting a moderate socialist party could help contain communism. As an Atlanticist, Stabler favored the PSOE, provided it presented a disciplined and organized front. He recalled Kissinger’s instruction to proceed slowly when speaking with Foreign Minister José María de Areilza. The evolving political calculations also involved balancing workers’ interests and socialist influence, with Kissinger reportedly coordinating meetings between U.S. union groups and Juan Carlos I to manage the transition more closely.
Kissinger and Western Sahara
Stabler advocated accelerating Spain’s transition of power from the aging Franco to Juan Carlos, but Kissinger resisted this push, warning that the transition should be delayed until Franco’s death. In parallel, Kissinger was a central figure in the 1975 arrangement that ushered Western Sahara from Spanish control to Moroccan and Mauritanian leadership. The tripartite agreement, led by King Hassan II, followed a conflict sparked by the Green March and the subsequent invasion of the territory. Powell stresses that while Kissinger and Juan Carlos did not believe in an independent Western Sahara state, they preferred Moroccan protection as a strategic ally for the United States, shaping post-colonial policy in the region.