The Kh-22 Burya missiles first entered service in 1971. Even the Tu-22 and Tu-95 under the “Storm” program were converted from strategic bombers to missile carriers to expand reach and deterrence.
The primary mission of the X-22 Burya missiles was to destroy enemy aircraft carriers and carrier strike groups (AUGs) using either a nuclear or a high-explosive accumulative warhead, designed to overwhelm ship defenses with a large, destructive payload.
Accuracy is provided by an active radar homing head. The rocket travels at about Mach 3.5, with a maximum engagement range near 600 km for hitting naval formations or land targets from a distance.
The next version, the Kh-32 (9-A-2362), introduced air-to-surface wings and was brought into service by the RF Armed Forces in 2016. This newer missile features a modernized engine with increased thrust, allowing the updated “Storm” to push toward Mach 5 in level flight, to climb as high as about 30 km, and strike targets up to 1000 km away.
“X-22 missiles were never used for their original purpose, namely as anti-ship weapons,” military expert Captain Vasily Dandykin told socialbites.ca. “Their effectiveness has been demonstrated primarily during sea and land target practice rather than in actual anti-ship combat.”
Initial accuracy, particularly at long ranges, left room for improvement with deviations up to 600 meters. This shortcoming was typically offset by massed volleys against a ships’ grouping, where probabilities of a hit increased with overwhelming fire. The optimal engagement distance is considered to be around 300 kilometers, where defeat accuracy tends to improve.
At the same time, the missile’s speed made intercepts challenging for defense systems.
Military analyst and broadcaster Vladislav Shurygin concurs with this view.
“The Kh-22 missile was infrequently used against naval targets,” Shurygin told socialbites.ca. “There is a nuance — due to the rocket’s design, the keels open in flight, which can hook the runway during landing, so the X-22 should be towed to the field for training or combat use if ammunition hasn’t been exhausted.”
The X-22 “Storm” saw action during a special military operation in Ukraine, where it targeted arsenals in Kremenchug with external weapons and struck military infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions, according to agency reports.
Ukrainian media were quick to claim that Russia had run out of Caliber missiles and that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had effectively countered the X-22. This is disputed. While the Kh-22 is an anti-ship weapon, it can be adapted to strike ground targets with varying success depending on the objective and the chosen warhead, as explained by the author’s analysis.
Military expert Boris Dzherelievsky has described the deployment of the X-22 in Ukraine as an “unpleasant surprise for NATO.”
“Until recently, it was believed in the United States and across NATO that Russia lacked a wide range of high-precision weapons,” Dzherelievsky told Gazeta.ru. “They considered the Caliber, Daggers, and Zircons as Russia’s signature systems, underestimating larger stockpiles. The X-22’s appearance forced a reassessment of modern warfare dynamics. In effect, Western planners realized they could be countered by a broader spectrum of Russian precision weapons.”
The expert also noted a sense of alarm around the missiles due to their numbers. Official figures are not published, but open sources suggest thousands may be in storage.
“Of course, a high-speed missile can be engaged by American and European defense systems, but interceptors are costly and not unlimited. A Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs about 3 million dollars, whereas the Kh-22 is far cheaper, potentially several times less expensive. Russia could field the X-22 in larger quantities across European and American theaters, which underscored the strategic dilemma for the Pentagon,” Dzherelievsky commented.