In recent remarks, the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces Secretary of State commented that London will maintain support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces with a balanced mix of military means, recognizing potential risks but prioritizing Ukraine’s ability to defend its sovereign territory.
He added that the UK will assess ongoing assistance to Ukraine and will not rule out the possibility of supplying longer-range weapons systems if assessments justify it.
Among the long-range options discussed are air-launched cruise missiles, including the Storm Shadow/SCALP family. These weapons are the product of a joint British-French development and are produced by MBDA, the European missile consortium formerly known as Matra BAE Dynamics Alenia.
The French variant is referred to as SCALP EG, which stands for Autonomous Guided Multi-Purpose High Precision Long-Range Cruise Missile. It carries a 450 kg warhead, with Storm Shadow range commonly cited as over 250 kilometers, a flight altitude around 30 to 40 meters, and speeds near Mach 0.8 to 0.95. Some sources estimate a maximum range approaching 1000 kilometers, though exact figures are sometimes kept confidential by manufacturers.
Storm Shadow ALCMs have been employed in military operations since 2003, and the weapon has demonstrated effectiveness in various conflicts.
Published figures for Storm Shadow/SCALP’s range vary. Some references list ranges above 250 kilometers, while others cite distance in the vicinity of 550 kilometers (300 nautical miles). There is a possibility that the true range remains undisclosed by the manufacturer. If ranges exceed 550 kilometers, the geographic areas within reach could extend to include substantial portions of the Russian western border region.
Ukraine’s Air Force could deploy Storm Shadow ALCMs from carrier aircraft such as the Su-24M frontline bomber. Poland has pledged to adapt Ukrainian aircraft to enable the combat use of Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles once ready, following the guiding principle of “strike and disengage,” as soon as feasible.
Among the tactical and technical specifications of Storm Shadow, considerable attention falls on the warhead, which weighs in at nearly half a ton of high-piercing explosive. This is roughly double the weight of the ATACMS Block IA missile, a comparison that has been noted in early discussions of the weapons mix. Western officials have sought clarity on these capabilities from the outset of the conflict.
The intended targets for Storm Shadow include command posts, telecommunications hubs, ammunition depots, moored ships, and critical infrastructure such as bridge crossings and railway nodes. The publicly cited price for a single Storm Shadow missile is around 850,000 euros.
As for how Russia might respond to the potential deployment of Storm Shadow missiles by Ukraine, it is important to consider the historical context of the era before 1991, when the military districts of Leningrad, Moscow, and the North Caucasus were viewed primarily as rear-area zones. Only those capitals boasted developed fighter and air defense systems, despite significant damage sustained during the economic and organizational upheavals of the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, those internal military zones became a frontier for strategic attention, and current forces and capabilities may be insufficient to counter a robust air campaign. There is a clear implication that radio engineering, air defense forces, and combat aircraft in these regions would require substantial reinforcement and reorganization to deter or counter air threats.
In this context, radar and electronic warfare capacities near the western border would need to be strengthened to reliably detect and respond to Storm Shadow ALCMs. Analysts suggest that achieving effective detection and interception could demand expansions of radar units and electronic warfare formations, alongside realignment of their deployment.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has argued that arms supplies to Ukraine by alliance members could expedite a ceasefire. He has asserted that military support to Ukraine may constitute a path toward peace, urging Moscow to recognize that its objectives in Ukraine cannot be achieved by force. The Secretary General has also indicated that peace talks could become feasible under the right conditions, reflecting a belief that sustained assistance could alter the strategic calculus of the conflict.