Giorgia Meloni’s victory in Sunday’s Italian election is reshaping European politics. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, signaled vigilance and has reasons to do so. Italy, the eurozone’s third-largest economy, now hosts a far-right government that opens a new front within the Union at a moment when the European project faces the Ukraine crisis and the broader impacts of Russia’s aggression on the economy and daily life.
The Ukrainian crisis marks the fourth major upheaval to test the European project in a little over a decade. The sequence includes the Great Recession, Brexit, the pandemic, and now war. Within the Union, tensions simmer over eastward expansion, domestic discontent with the Union, and rising nationalist sentiment across several member states. Meloni’s ascent presents a challenge not merely because far-right, conservative, and nationalist forces are gaining ground in 16 of the 27 EU countries, but because treating the far right as a reactive, limited issue through measures like cordons sanitaires is increasingly inadequate. Meloni’s victory stands as a blunt reminder that Europe is intertwined with its own social, economic, and political realities, whether they align with traditional liberal norms or not.
Warsaw-Budapest-Rome axis
Italy is not just another member state. Its weight in the economy matters, but its political symbolism matters even more. Italy has long been central to European integration, a founding member that helped shape the Union’s trajectory. It is not a distant ex-Soviet state that joined a pro-European project by chance; it is a core part of the Western European identity. Since Sunday, doubt has crept in about that self-image, and questions about the future of Europeanism in Italy have become more pronounced.
The ascent of a far-right, nativist, and nationalist discourse, even while its anti-European rhetoric has softened at times, signals a setback for the steady, optimistic narrative of European integration this century. Meloni has shown affinity for Viktor Orban’s Hungary, prompting talk of a Warsaw-Budapest-Rome axis. European funds have flowed in at substantial levels, yet the political turnover points to a broader rethinking of European unity. The stance represents a pragmatic shift within a party that has captured attention while the broader EU discourse changes tone in response to Meloni’s victory. Defenders of liberal democracy perceive this as a warning that the old safeguards may be tested in new ways.
From Marine Le Pen to Macarena Olona?
Across the European left, social democracy, and Christian-democratic traditions, concerns about the rise of the far right have persisted for years. The worry has been that cordons sanitaires would keep the movement at bay, but the far right has already become normalized in several countries. In places like France and Italy, more than one party competes for the ultras’ vote. Meloni’s victory thus sends powerful signals to France, Spain, and even Germany: Western European democracies face a real possibility of ultranationalist movements taking root within the project’s core. The question now is whether institutions of liberal democracy—at national and European levels—can meet this challenge in practice. Some voices in the political spectrum elsewhere have embraced the shift; others remain skeptical about the durability of liberal norms in the face of growing nationalist tides. The role of influential voices like Steve Bannon has been part of the public commentary, though the consequences remain contested.
and the wolf came
After years of warnings about the far right, the moment arrived. Meloni’s win, a woman who speaks Italian, signals that the far right is no longer merely a protest movement but part of the European electorate. Voters who are not simply reacting to the trend may see the ultras as offering a coherent program rather than a mere response to economic pain. The consequences of the 2008 crisis and the effects of globalization are tangible: rising nationalism, a push for cultural preservation, tighter immigration controls, a stronger stance on state sovereignty, and a skepticism toward certain liberal social values. The evolution from slogans to policy in movements like MAGA-style nationalism to Meloni’s Italian model reflects a broader trend across Europe and beyond.
Not all Europeans vote for the far right as a form of protest. Some are drawn to a platform that emphasizes tighter immigration control, a powerful state, and a willingness to resist Brussels on core sovereignty issues. Yet this program, even when modified for pragmatic purposes, challenges the European project. The examples of Warsaw and Budapest, and even London, illustrate how nationalist currents can reshape policy and politics across the continent.
Berlusconi, moderate: democratic corruption
Although trends are regional, each country operates in its own distinct political universe. Italy has long served as a laboratory where political practices, institutional distance, corruption, and party-system disintegration have shaped public sentiment. The possibility of Mussolini’s heirs reappearing has lingered for years. Today, Italy is often described as a country where figures like Silvio Berlusconi can still inhabit a centrist space. Similar dynamics appear in other European nations, with tailored adaptations that reflect local histories and institutions. The current political climate shows that the spectacle and fear politics can be fertile ground for populism, underscoring the fragility of democratic norms when confronted with sustained crises and provocative leadership. [Source: European political analysis, contemporary governance studies]