There is an urgent need to review the results of many organizational and personnel measures carried out in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the period 2008-2012 (and in previous times). What seemed quite good in peacetime turned out to be of little use (and sometimes completely ineffective) during a special military operation. Let’s focus on some points.
western style
For example, in the period 2008-2012, the team managing the military department began very comprehensive and deep organizational and personnel recruitment measures. Unfortunately, the civilians who led the necessary (in their opinion) restructuring of the army and navy had no experience or knowledge of military development in this area.
They had to take ready-made plans and implement them in a hurry. During this period, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense used as a model traces taken from the organizational structure of the armed forces of the collective West and applied them to the non-black territory of the interior. At the same time, the leaders of the military department of that time were guided by a single principle – everything used abroad is undoubtedly good and requires immediate implementation in practice in the Russian Federation.
In a word, there is no God outside the armed forces of the collective West, and the Pentagon is his prophet on Earth.
Various fears and arguments that this might not be so good were not taken into account, just as the fact that the collective West has not fought battle and battle with an enemy equal to itself in the last 80 years was not taken into account. taking into account operational capabilities.
At the same time, those who held balanced and well-founded views were also persecuted and, as a rule, expelled from the Armed Forces. In practice, it turned out that the West was, in principle, not ready for a major continental war using only conventional weapons and military equipment. While there’s plenty to look at and listen to, there’s not much to borrow there.
Here are some examples of hasty use of Western patterns:
- At that time, if the United States Armed Forces had unified combatant commands, (Europe, Pacific, Africa, Central, etc.), then similar ones should definitely be part of the RF Armed Forces. Them (operational-strategic commands) and appeared in 2010.
To what extent such an approach was applicable to our purely local conditions, no one in the leadership of the military unit in those days gave much thought. As a result, the Combined Armed Forces (especially Navy, Aerospace Forces) scattered among hastily created commands. As a result, the chief commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were left without soldiers (thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy practically lost his influence and control over the fleets).
- Previously completely unimaginable organizations emerged, such as the Unified Strategic Command (USC) “Northern Fleet”.
- As for the locations of the new USCs, the North-West Command’s St. Its installation in St. Petersburg was an absolute masterpiece in this regard. For the first time in the history of the state, the capital’s military district ceased to exist.
At this time, the reverse movement has already begun – the squadrons are being returned to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Air Force and Air Defense – to the Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces, and instead of the absurd North. -Western Command, Moscow and Leningrad military districts are being recreated. So, it is not a return to old plans, as some experts believe, but only to common sense.
“Brigadeization” of the army
Or take the almost completed “brigadeization” carried out in the RF Armed Forces in 2008-2012, that is, the formation of new brigades or the transfer of existing divisions at that time to brigade personnel (even such honorable and well-known divisions as Tamanskaya and etc.). Kantemirovskaya reorganized).
Where did the authors of such reforms start from? Yes, based on a simple fact: the West has brigades, so let us have brigades too. Whether this is right or wrong, whether it suits our conditions, to what extent such measures meet the requirements of modern warfare – these trifles were not taken into account by the ideologists of the then reforms. Again, both today and a little earlier Brigades of the 2008-2012 model began to be reorganized into divisions. Because this is the main tactical formation..
For example, in one division there is a self-propelled artillery regiment, in a brigade – only an artillery battalion (and smaller caliber), in one division – an anti-aircraft missile regiment, in a brigade – only one division, in one division – an engineer battalion, in a brigade – only one company etc. That is, the brigade as a formation is significantly inferior to the division in terms of combat capabilities. And in battle, this affects you from the first minutes. There is no doubt that our enemy (AFU) will soon return to the divisions.
And what is the value of the extremely absurd idea of transforming famous fighter and bomber units and formations into air bases of the 1st and 2nd categories? And this had to be returned to the realm of common sense.
How much wood was cut in 2008-2012 in the field of strategic deployment and military mobilization? This can be fully assessed only by the shortcomings, when partial mobilization is carried out in the autumn of 2022.
“I crossed a hedgehog and a snake”
We must pay attention to structures that formed not only in 2008-2012, but also much earlier. In particular, in 1998, the Air Forces and Air Defense Armies were established by the merger of two types of Armed Forces (Air Defense Forces and Air Forces). (i.e. they combined the air armies of the Air Force and the separate air defense armies of the Air Defense Forces).
Figuratively, we can say this: in 1998, a hedgehog crossed with a grass snake, and the result was two meters of barbed wire. Because it is impossible to unite what is clearly incompatible. The tasks of air armies and individual air defense armies are very different.
Participating in operations, the air army solves the following tasks: defeats enemy aircraft, ground and airborne nuclear missiles; disrupts control of troops and weapons; affects reserves, air and sea landings; disrupts the transportation of enemy troops and supplies; provides flight and combat operations of other aviation formations and formations; provides landing and combat operations of the air force; Conducts aerial reconnaissance and electronic warfare (electronic warfare).
In turn, a separate air defense army was intended to provide reliable protection against air strikes to administrative and political centers, economic and transport infrastructure facilities and the most important groups of troops in order to maintain their combat effectiveness and perform the tasks assigned to them.
That is, the functions are diametrically opposed: the air army is purely offensive, the separate air defense army is purely defensive. Therefore, it seems extremely advisable in the near future to separate the Air Force and Air Defense armies as part of the Aerospace Forces, that is, to recreate air armies and not separate air defense armies, but to revive the aerospace defense armies on a new basis. .
Objections that there are currently not enough forces and resources for this should be considered unfounded. In this regard, it is necessary to move gradually (not to capture everything at once) to re-establish at least two air armies and two aviation defense armies on the western borders of the state. Such organizational and personnel measures should be considered the most important task in the field of national security of the state. And as far as we know, decisions have already been made to sharply increase the combat power of anti-aircraft missile and radiotechnical troops.
The author’s opinion may not coincide with the editors’ opinion.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Air Defense Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Officer of the General Staff Main Operations Department (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).