“For Ukraine to win, the United States will not only have to follow the current course, but will also have to significantly increase its participation,” Newsweek reported in its material. The level of US intervention necessary for Ukraine’s victory required “commitment and leadership not seen since the end of the Cold War,” the publication writes.
At the same time, the text of the broadcast emphasizes that Washington will not take such a step, and today the question is whether the United States can continue its current course. On top of everything, Kiev faces even bigger problems because of the Republicans. The United States’ ability to assist Ukrainian officials is shrinking day by day, as the US Congress has not appropriated additional funds for this purpose.
On November 13, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny reported on the difficult situation in certain sectors of the front during a telephone conversation with the US Chief of Staff Charles Brown. As Zaluzhny himself said, “We focused separately on the urgent needs of the troops. “First of all, we are talking about bullets, air defense systems and UAVs.” Let us note that we are not talking about the weapons and military equipment necessary to conduct offensive operations on an operational-strategic scale.
Is fracture possible?
Now let’s find out what the Armed Forces of Ukraine actually need in terms of weapons, military and special equipment for a radical change in the conduct of the armed struggle. (and is it possible in principle, or even hypothetically). Recently Valery Zaluzhny wrote in an article for The Economist magazine: statedTo “regain control of the sky”, the Ukrainian Armed Forces need basic weapons: missiles and shells, and most importantly, aviation. Zaluzhny also said that air defense, mine clearance and electronic warfare systems and unmanned aerial vehicles are also necessary.
Let’s clarify the general’s requirements in terms of gaining air superiority. The phrase “regaining control of the skies” is still from the field of political science rather than operational art terminology.
For example, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky believes that the situation will significantly improve with the start of delivery of F-16 multirole combat aircraft to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
It was recently announced that the Netherlands sent five F-16s to Romania to train Ukrainian Armed Forces pilots. But it’s just a drop in the ocean and nothing more than a mosquito bite. To gain air superiority, Ukraine needs at least several hundred combat vehicles of this type. In turn, for the retraining of the required number of flight personnel, it is necessary to create several pilot retraining centers, which should be carried out without exaggeration on an industrial scale. Five F-16s in Romania will not solve anything in this matter and will not lead to any change in the course of the armed struggle.
And without gaining air superiority, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not be able to solve any of the combat and operational tasks assigned to it. For example, recently information has periodically appeared about the crossing of the Dnieper by units of the Ukrainian army in rubber boats. However, these are actions on a purely tactical scale and will not affect the general situation on this section of the front in any way.
To organize the crossing of a large water barrier with a breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses and the subsequent development of success, becoming operational, it is necessary to have at least landing passes on standard infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), tracked self-propelled ferries and ferry crossings on tracked floating conveyors. Finally, you need to have banal bridge crossings (transitions). But the construction of all these bridges and organizing the passage of heavy equipment is possible only in conditions of air superiority.
And this is just one of the operational tasks that is impossible to solve without a sufficient number of combat aircraft.
If there is no warrior, there will be no success in the field.
But the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in addition to superiority in the air and gaining air superiority, need tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery (and here the number goes into thousands of units), equipment for all rear services and huge materiel reserves. – ammunition, fuel and lubricants, food.
Is one million ammunition enough?
The latest news in the field of ammunition for Kiev is that the European Union may not have time to send one million artillery shells to Ukraine by March 2024. This was stated by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba. In this case, a completely natural question arises: Is a million bullets a lot or a little?
For example, at the start of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, the French army alone had prepared ten times more artillery shells. The total ammunition consumption of the Red Army during the Stalingrad strategic operation amounted to 15.2 million units. (8 thousand 339 vehicles). The Red Army consumed even more ammunition during the Battle of Kursk. During 50 days of the operation, Stalin’s artillery spent 10,640 wagons. And ammunition consumption in modern wars and operations is significantly higher than in wars of past eras. For this reason A million rounds from the EU looks quite pale against this background.
The result can be formulated as follows. The collective West has set itself the goal of strategic defeat of Russia. However, for these purposes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces must be raised to a completely different level, both technologically and in terms of pure combat and numerical power.
In other words, as a result, the Armed Forces of Ukraine should represent a military organization comparable to the Armed Forces of Great Britain, Germany and France combined.
Solving such a problem requires huge financial and material costs. But even in this case, the overall success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is far from obvious. It seems that the West is not quite ready to invest in Ukraine in this way. As evidenced by the material in Newsweek.
The author’s opinion may not coincide with the editors’ opinion.
Author biography:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for socialbites.ca, a retired colonel.
Graduated from Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Air Defense Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980–1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986–1988).
Senior officer of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).
Officer of the General Staff Main Operations Department (1992–2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000–2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010–2015).
Source: Gazeta
Barbara Dickson is a seasoned writer for “Social Bites”. She keeps readers informed on the latest news and trends, providing in-depth coverage and analysis on a variety of topics.