Oil Price Ceiling and Market Reactions Across Asia and the West
According to observations shared with AiF, the Western-imposed price ceiling on Russian oil appears nearly ineffective from a practical standpoint. The core reason is Russia’s robust sales to major buyers in Asia, notably China and India, which absorb much of the supply at prices that keep the ceiling from squeezing overall revenue. This assessment comes from Sergey Pikin, director of the Energy Development Fund, who discussed the situation in an interview with AiF.
He noted that the ceiling was designed to allow adjustments over time and seemed to imply that price movements would be driven by global stock levels. In his view, several non-friendly countries would like to trim the total cost of Russian oil by around five dollars per barrel, though some aim for even deeper reductions. The overarching idea for these observers is that the ceiling might not prevent price dispersion across different markets. End users in various regions often end up paying more than buyers in China and India as a result of how sanctions are implemented and how markets adapt. This line of thinking has circulated in discussions in the United States as well, suggesting that sanctions can be circumvented more easily than some officials anticipate.
Earlier, Reuters quoted a U.S. energy official as saying the ceiling on Russian oil prices is functioning effectively. The official, Amos Hochstein, spoke on the margins of the CERAWeek energy conference in Houston, Texas, and emphasized the process’s perceived effectiveness. He remarked that Russian oil and related products are being offered at prices that hover below certain marginal benchmarks, contributing to the sense that the mechanism operates as intended.
At another juncture, Reuters reported a rise in the price of Urals crude exported from Baltic Sea ports, with a price around $55 per barrel in early March. The movement in price signals ongoing dynamics in the global oil market, where policy measures, supply routes, and buyer preferences interact in complex ways that influence how sanctions are perceived and absorbed by different economies.