Unaffiliated Deputies and Governance in the Provincial Assembly

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Unaffiliated deputies and pay rules in the Provincial Assembly

The recent period brought changes to the number of unaffiliated deputies in the Provincial Assembly, highlighting notable contrasts with past events. Fernando Sepulcre’s departure from Ciudadanos on June 20, 2016 currently stands out as a reference point. He led the party’s mandate at the time, and although his vote carried weight, he did not hold government executive powers. It took nine days for the then-popular president, César Sánchez, to reduce his salary and dismiss the two advisers tied to Ciudadanos. This sequence illustrates how swiftly leadership decisions can tilt the balance of influence inside the chamber.

At that moment, the framework regulating such matters was not fully established. The internal report examined a 2009 Constitutional Court ruling in which four unaffiliated former lawmakers—María Teresa Carbonell, Loreto Martínez, Francisco J. Miralles, and José Antonio Mourisco—sought protection to speak and vote in information commissions. This historical touchpoint helps explain the current debate on speaking rights and attendance in commissions and plenary sessions by MPs who are not full-time members of the assembly.

Presently, MPs Julia Parra and Javier Gutiérrez, who no longer receive full-time salaries, have the right to attend and participate in each commission and plenary session. They receive 250 and 350 euros respectively for their participation. The situation mirrors the earlier case with Fernando Sepulcre, whose corporate representative engaged with multiple bodies and ultimately earned an annual salary of 49,962.04 euros plus attendance. As noted on the Provincial Assembly’s Transparency page, a typical arrangement in Suma can amount to around 800 euros per quarter, with roughly a dozen such positions within the provincial institution. These figures underscore the ongoing tension between compensation and formal authority among unaffiliated or partially affiliated legislators.

Mazón fires a Cs adviser and will go to court if the opposition holds the rest

Questions about qualifications hover over the ongoing discussions. Case law indicates that asylum conditions are not open to enhancement, yet regulatory gaps can create jurisdictional ambiguities. The current landscape marks a clear departure from the era of earlier non-members who lacked a firm hold on public funds and decision-making power. Neither Sepulcre, Domingo Soler (formerly with the PP under José Joaquín Ripoll), nor the individuals named above ever commanded the public square in a way that would give them exclusive power to direct municipal resources.

Recently, independent members who were released are part of the board of directors, with the possibility of resignation or removal by the president. If Julia Parra were to resign, she would automatically lose her vice-presidential status, though that outcome has not been raised as a concrete option in the current discussions. These dynamics reflect the fluidity of governance roles when formal mandates are unsettled.

Good Government Code?

Legal experts speculate that a governance gap could allow some individuals to maintain their positions in the Infrastructure or Culture portfolios, given that the existing norms address only the loss of economic status. The debates touch ethics and aesthetics in governance and resonate with cooperation agreements tied to the Anti-Corruption Department of the Provincial Assembly of Alicante and the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces.

In 2015, the assembly joined the Good Governance Rules. One notable provision states that elected officials should respect the will of citizens and adhere to a code of conduct regarding renegade behavior in local companies. This remains the primary point in the ethical framework, aside from references to political loyalty by elected councilors. Importantly, signing such agreements does not carry binding legal consequences because the councillor’s act is personal and non-transferable, and only resignation would allow the party to keep the seat. This nuance helps explain why some accountability mechanisms remain symbolic rather than legally enforceable in every case.

There is also an observation that the evaluation report prepared in 2023 may not be repeated by the current provincial institution, signaling a shift in how governance assessments are conducted and published. This evolving landscape continues to shape how transparency, accountability, and power are balanced in the provincial administration and its related bodies.

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