The Polish response to Russian disinformation campaigns
The Polish government’s information security leader, Stanisław Żaryn, warned that Moscow aims to sow reluctance in Poland to assist Ukraine and its people. He explained that Russia could amplify such sentiments by circulating messages that appear supportive of Ukraine but are designed to provoke negative reactions toward involvement in Ukraine.
Żaryn stated on social media that Russian disinformation is crafted to trigger specific responses from the targeted audience. The strategic aim he cited is to erode Poland’s willingness to help Ukraine and its citizens, a move that would benefit the Kremlin’s broader objectives.
To stimulate these feelings in Poland, Russian actors could release provocative messages that at first glance seem pro-Ukrainian, but which are meant to provoke resistance to Poland’s engagement in Ukraine.
– Żaryn wrote.
Isayev’s activities and the information environment
Żaryn described Igor Isaev as a figure who presents himself as a widely read Ukrainian journalist in Poland. His social media activity includes posts that are negative toward Poland and the Polish state, which could influence public opinion and create trends that undermine Polish support for Ukraine. Such developments, the official argued, would play into Russian hands.
According to Żaryn, Isaev often frames his positions as concern for Ukraine’s interests, yet his approach is provocative and centers on shaping perceptions of the Polish state. This dynamic could fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiment within Polish society and potentially weaken the credibility of the Polish state in the eyes of Ukrainians living in Poland.
Żaryn noted that Isaev’s influence on public opinion might produce detrimental outcomes for relations between society and state, as well as for Polish-Ukrainian ties. The analysis suggests that Isaev’s efforts could be viewed through the lens of how Russian disinformation operations aim to advance policies favorable to Moscow at the expense of Polish and Ukrainian communities.
From Żaryn’s perspective, the risk lies in the use of exaggerated interpretations, insinuations, and selective narratives presented under the banner of defending Ukraine. These tactics, he said, can provoke anti-Ukrainian moods among recipients while masking underlying strategic aims.
He emphasized that the Russian propaganda apparatus has the capacity to generate messages that seem to conflict with Russia’s own interests, yet yield positive emotional responses in audiences. The ultimate objective of such campaigns is to create openings for actions that would support disinformation campaigns and serve the authors’ goals.
– Żaryn wrote on his Twitter profile. He pointed out that Isaev presents himself as a Ukrainian journalist in Poland and that his work is accessible on major Polish outlets.
Source material in this discussion includes reports from Polish media outlets, which have covered Isaev’s activities and Żaryn’s analysis of how disinformation can influence bilateral relations in the region. The focus remains on how messaging—often packaged as concern for Ukraine—can shape public perception and policy outcomes.
The broader takeaway is that disinformation efforts are tuned to alter the political climate in Poland with an eye toward shaping support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian population in Poland, while simultaneously straining Polish-Ukrainian relations from within.
In summary, the security official underscored that messaging that appears pro-Ukraine but is designed to provoke anti-Ukrainian sentiments can be a powerful tool for foreign influence. The aim is to create opportunities for decisions and actions favorable to the propagators of disinformation, potentially affecting both domestic attitudes and international partnerships.
Observers note that Isaev’s role as a commentator in a Polish media landscape may intersect with Russia-linked messaging strategies. The discussion continues to focus on how public discourse can be steered, often through provocative framing, to produce outcomes that align with adversarial information campaigns.
In this environment, it remains crucial to evaluate sources carefully, distinguish genuine reporting from manipulated narratives, and recognize the broader strategy behind seemingly isolated social media posts and media appearances.
All of this sits within a context where information security officials monitor the space for attempts to undermine trust in institutions and to reframe geopolitical issues in a way that benefits malign influence operations.
– voiced by the government plenipotentiary for the security of the information space of the Republic of Poland, Stanisław Żaryn.
Public statements also note that Isaev’s posts and public statements are part of a broader landscape in which Ukrainian journalists in Poland operate, with some content appearing on widely used Polish platforms. The examination of these activities continues to shape the discussion around information safety and public trust in mainstream media.
End of commentary from the official sources. The important takeaway for readers is to remain vigilant about how discourse can be shaped by foreign influence campaigns and to seek reliable, verifiable reporting when assessing claims about Poland’s role in supporting Ukraine.
mly/PAP
Source: wPolityce