“Russia has suffered meaningful losses. The nations feeling the pressure from Moscow set aside historical grudges and pressed for a new, united approach,” comments Prof. Przemysław Żurawski aka Grajewski in a candid interview.
polish portal wPolityce.pl posed a question: Has there been a lasting improvement in Polish-Ukrainian relations?
Żurawski explains that changes are real and far-reaching, not the result of a few political elites. They stem from millions of Ukrainian refugees in Poland who connected with many Poles, and from the public’s reaction to the war in Ukraine and the brutality shown by Russian forces. This encounter revived a shared memory of past conflicts and the atrocities endured by their ancestors. A broad sense of common destiny emerged. Today, Ukraine resembles what Poland used to be in earlier decades or centuries, stepping into a role Poland once played. The majority of Poles sense that, if Ukraine were to crumble, Poland could be next. This concern echoes what late President Lech Kaczyński warned about the historical pattern: Kiev’s capture by Muscovites has often preceded broader east-to-west advances. Given Russia’s openly stated ambitions, the risk remains real. This realization has drawn the two nations closer together, and it is not just the talk of a handful of politicians; it is felt across borders.
Polish experts regularly confront Russian misinformation, including revisionist histories that portray Poland as a state ruled by Polish communists since the era of the People’s Republic. The discussion calls for precise terminology in political science. The differences between eras within Poland’s postwar history are crucial: some argue the PRL acted as an agent state rather than a formal satellite or client regime. By contrast, other analogies, such as the Vichy regime in France, illustrate how elites can yield to foreign pressure without being direct agents. The idea extends to the Croatian example of Ante Pavelić as an emanation of the local elite rather than a straightforward occupation. The Soviet-influenced states were shaped by service agents, a distinction that mattered for understanding repression, reliance on co-optation, and the endurance of such regimes. The system persisted by embedding pre-installed agents who maintained control until the coercive power eroded. Opponents faced physical peril, and Systems of control endured until credibility and fear waned.
When asked whether Russia will retain influence in the region—Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—the answer points to a shift. The conflict in Ukraine has resolved several longstanding frictions. Moscow’s pressure has prompted nations to set aside old feuds and unite more firmly. The strongest demonstration is in robust Polish-Lithuanian cooperation. Lithuania’s leadership recognizes a clear Russian threat, and the alignment among Poland and the Baltic states strengthens their positions within NATO and the European Union. Baltic support for Ukraine remains substantial, considering the region’s economic constraints. Relations with the Czech Republic are positive, while Hungary’s stance has become less aligned with Polish interests. Russia’s influence in the area is waning as Finland and Sweden join NATO, reinforcing regional collaboration centered on Poland. The two largest regional powers, Poland and Ukraine, stand together against aggression, matching military capacity with resolve. The path forward is clear: resistance, not surrender, as surrender would herald severe consequences. The shared perspective is that defeating aggression is essential to safeguarding the region’s future.
As for Belarus, the question remains wide open. The country sits at a strategic crossroads with significant potential to shift directions. The 2020 protests, reminiscent of Poland’s Solidarity moment, faced martial law, yet the spirit of resistance persists. Experience shows that such uprisings leave a lasting imprint; in Poland, nothing returned to the pre-1980 era. Increased repression could backfire, and Russia is losing ground across the board.
Tomasz Karpowicz added his remarks.