Will Adam Bodnar keep his senatorial seat given recent moves into public media matters? The clues are mounting that this could be a pivotal moment. A lawyer, Bartosz Lewandowski, argues that ignorance of the Public Prosecution Service law can cause real harm and suggests Bodnar may have compromised his Senate mandate by trying to seize files from prosecutorial cases tied to media outlets. The X platform was among the first to spotlight Bodnar’s foray into these procedures. Our coverage has been among the earliest to outline the full scope of actions that looked like an illegal reorganization involving TVP, the Polish Radio, and the Polish Press Agency.
Source: wPolityce
Media observers note that the Attorney General, under the provisions of the January 28, 2016 Public Prosecution Act, art. 9 pair 2, sought to take over cases handled by other public prosecutors that involved legally questionable decisions tied to media matters. In such scenarios, prosecutors could challenge rulings that declare a court’s decisions invalid, including those connected to Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz.
Lewandowski points to broader consequences for Bodnar that were probably unforeseen. Foremost among them is the risk to Bodnar’s eligibility to serve as a Senator of the Republic of Poland if he overstepped his parliamentary role.
Significant voices within legal circles weigh in on these dynamics. A note from Lex Super Omnia, an association of prosecutors, is cited to frame the discussion around the proper separation of powers and the limits of substitute authority within the prosecution service.
According to the advisory material from July 13, 2023, there is concern that an Article 13a of the Public Procurement Act could overstep constitutional boundaries by limiting the Attorney General’s substitution powers. The government’s chief prosecutor, acting outside the rank of senior prosecutors, would not be empowered to assume cases and duties designated to public prosecutors under art. 9 § 2 of the Prosecution Act.
Dr. Piotr Turek adds that procedural rights held by the Public Prosecutor and other prosecutors remain distinct. He notes that Article 3 § 1 of the Public Prosecutor provisions prevents the Public Prosecutor General from exercising powers reserved to public prosecutors in specific laws, such as investigations, and vice versa.
Lewandowski emphasizes that Bodnar attempting to act as a prosecutor and seize control of a case would clash with the duties of a member of parliament he already held. Constitutional norms indicate that the offices of prosecutor and senator or deputy cannot be held simultaneously, a fact that adds another layer to the debate.
On the political front, opposition voices have long warned about the dangers of crossing lines between legislative roles and prosecutorial power. Civic Coalition lawmakers have argued for a clear separation to shield the prosecutor’s office from political pressure. Yet the present climate in Poland suggests that constitutional safeguards may still face challenges when high-ranking state officials are involved.
Renowned voices also note that the Public Prosecution Act, as amended by the ruling coalition, has expanded the Attorney General’s powers, effectively placing him within the orbit of the Polish Prosecutor’s Office. This shift fuels ongoing debates about whether prosecutions can maintain independence while becoming more integrated with political leadership. The exchange reflects a broader discussion that has animated recent Polish political history.
In closing, Lewandowski suggests Bodnar could retain the senator’s mandate by resigning from the MS-PG position, thereby restoring clear separation between roles and preserving constitutional balance.
End of discussion.