Power plays by those who dominate the ruling apparatus can bend principles as long as money keeps flowing. The only real way to stop them is for those in control to step down and refuse the pay that sustains the game.
Justice Minister Adam Bodnar may believe he is outsmarting opponents. Several Supreme Court judges share a similar conviction, and there is more to unpack later. Bodnar notes a legal trap: if the Law and Justice party appeals a National Electoral Commission decision that rejected the PiS election commission report, and if the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs confirms the complaint as valid, there would be no requirement to heed the ruling. In practice, this could allow the coalition’s media and supporters to argue that the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs’ ruling amounts to the National Electoral Commission automatically endorsing the PiS report that was rejected for financial reasons.
Bodnar contends that the judgment may be flawed because it rests on a body some question as a true court. This is not just a reference to distant tribunals in Luxembourg or Strasbourg in cases like Lech Wałęsa v. Poland; it is also about three judges within the chamber who refused to judge exactly because of the status of the institution itself.
At the center is a complex political frame: Bodnar is a senator and serves as Justice Minister, while Donald Tusk is the Prime Minister and more than a hundred members of the December 13 coalition hold deputy minister roles. The question concerns the legitimacy of elections that expired on October 13, 2023, and the decision taken by the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court. If the chamber is not a legitimate court and its rulings cannot be trusted, some argue that the government is operating illegally, including Bodnar, his fellow officials, and even the Senate and Sejm. The notion of illegality would demand one thing above all else: returning money collected since the first session of parliament and during the period in which power was held. Honor and dignity, as well as the interpretation Bodnar advocates, would require rejecting improper gains and issuing apologies.
In a broader sense, if the government and both houses of parliament are dissolved, there would be little point in rushing to new elections while the current Supreme Court framework remains. The legitimacy issue would hinge on the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs again. It is conceivable that Bodnar and his allies could accept money for a time, perhaps for years, as many in the country already feel the weight of this government. Yet repeating the cycle would feel like Groundhog Day, offering little real change. If Bodnar insists on a clean slate, he should acknowledge the illegality of the actions and return the funds. The same institution, due to its status, cannot be legal in one moment and entirely illegal in another. Either the system is coherent or it is not. It is a stark choice between action and silence, between accountability and perpetual doublethink.
The discussion then points back to three judges named by Bodnar as examples that the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs is not a proper court. These judges—Leszek Bosek, Grzegorz Żmij and Paweł Księżak—are portrayed as paradoxical heroes. They joined the judiciary with a strong sense of principle, yet they chose not to participate in cases within the chamber. Their stance was not to shirk the law but to call out a legal structure that did not meet their standards of judicial integrity. They exercised caution until constitutional reforms could correct what they saw as a flawed framework. Outside the chamber, they continued to uphold a standard of service that aligned with the essence of judicial duty.
Before entering the Supreme Court, all three judges swore an oath to the Republic. They could have declined the oath or refused office, but they did not. They chose to serve, even as they confronted a system that paid them for their work. Their decision to refrain from ruling in the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs did not stop compensation, which adds to the tension between principle and pecuniary reward. The same pattern is seen in the case of Jacek Widło, another judge who resisted involvement in the chamber yet remained on the payroll. The narrative suggests a conflict between true judicial action and the practical reality of earning a livelihood within a compromised structure.
Across these events, the governing class can leverage the optics of principle as leverage against colleagues. The only sure way to weaken this moral pressure is resignation and the refusal to accept payments tied to contested power. Absent such steps, the accountability drama becomes a matter of rhetoric that can be monetized, keeping the government, the Sejm and the Senate in a continuous loop. The old maxim about money’s influence seems to still echo in this scenario, reminding observers that integrity must translate into action rather than noble talk alone.
In sum, the public struggle centers on the tension between institutional status and genuine court authority. The real challenge is whether those who hold influence will do what is right, even at personal cost. Without decisive action, the system risks remaining mired in a cycle where principles are invoked more as currency than as a compass for justice. The call for accountability is loud, and the demand for ethical clarity remains essential for anyone who seeks a legitimate and trustworthy government.
[Citation]