Pashinyan’s border
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who led the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Yerevan on November 23, reported that participants could not finalize two documents during the meeting. The gathering brought together CSTO member states to review security cooperation and crisis response in the region.
Opening the CSTO session in a broader format, Pashinyan noted that the group had met in a constricted format first, presenting 17 draft decisions. He said there was consensus on 15 of those projects, with two drafts sent back for revision to address outstanding concerns. This reflects the ongoing cadence of multilateral diplomacy where agreements are often achieved on most items while key documents require further refinement.
At the final briefing, Stanislav Zas, the CSTO Secretary General, confirmed that Armenia did not sign two documents: a draft resolution on assistance to Armenia and a final declaration on supporting Armenia. He explained that, given the current tensions along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, several measures had been prepared with a high level of readiness. Both documents were considered ready for signature but still needed finishing edits before being presented to the heads of state for formal approval. The secretary general stressed that this is a typical part of the process in large alliances, where consensus on every nuance is rare and some texts require further polishing before adoption.
In his remarks, Zas described the described sequence of events as normal, noting that no international body brings together states that see every issue in exactly the same way. The absence of unanimous agreement does not imply a failure but rather reflects the diverse perspectives within a broad security bloc.
What does not fit Yerevan
During the CSTO meeting, Pashinyan argued that despite collective security guarantees, Armenia faced attacks from Azerbaijan during the ongoing Karabakh conflict, which flared anew around 2020. He stressed that Armenia has experienced at least three attacks from Azerbaijan over the past two years, underscoring a pattern of aggression that challenges regional stability.
He also pointed out that Armenia’s CSTO membership has not deterred Azerbaijani aggressions, and so far the bloc has not reached a decision on a robust response. These issues are seen as harming the CSTO’s image both domestically and internationally. Pashinyan suggested that the leadership’s hesitation to act stands as a key shortcoming in the organization’s ability to project a united front in times of crisis.
Reflecting on earlier episodes, he recalled how the CSTO responded to mass protests in Kazakhstan in January 2022, noting that a timely, decisive move helped quell unrest and prevent a coup. This example, he argued, should guide how the alliance addresses similar situations where allied obligations might be tested by political upheaval or cross-border clashes.
The Armenian government’s press service also published Pashinyan’s explanation for declining to sign the two final documents. The prime minister argued that the draft declaration and the aid resolution lacked a clear political assessment of Azerbaijan’s actions within the framework of allied relations. He emphasized that a precise analysis is essential not only for Armenia’s territorial integrity but also for deterring future aggression.
He reminded that Azerbaijan’s ongoing actions risk another violation of Armenia’s borders, a concern that CSTO members have monitored. In light of this, he inferred that a vague political stance would be interpreted by some as a signal of tolerance for aggression, which would undermine the alliance’s credibility and determent of future threats.
Thus, he concluded that signing the documents in their current form would run counter to the spirit and intent of the CSTO’s core commitments, and he chose not to endorse them at that time.
Later, Russian news outlets displaying a Kremlin pool video captured a moment where a headline read that Pashinyan would not sign anything. In the clip, the Armenian premier is heard thanking participants after the meeting ends, while the room shows a mix of surprise and questioning reactions. Such sweeping interpretations of brief moments often accompany high-stakes diplomatic gatherings and can shape public perception in ways that diverge from the actual, measured conclusions reached by leaders and diplomats.
The conflict between Yerevan and Baku escalated into the Second Karabakh War at the end of September 2020. The fighting, which lasted for about six weeks, involved intense use of heavy weaponry and air power, resulting in thousands of fatalities on both sides. A ceasefire brokered in November 2020 by Moscow led to Armenia losing control over several districts around Nagorno-Karabakh. Domestic critics accused Pashinyan of mismanaging diplomacy and military strategy. Since then, clashes have recurred periodically, underscoring the fragile, fragile balance in the region and the persistent risk of renewed hostilities.
What do they think in the Kremlin?
Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, was among the first to comment publicly on Armenia’s stance. He acknowledged that Pashinyan has the right to assess the situation as a perceived failure of the CSTO while also noting that the bloc remains a critical framework for regional security. He suggested that while disagreements exist, Armenia’s continued membership is in the bloc’s interest and that Moscow would keep facilitating dialogue to persuade parties toward a peaceful settlement and the signing of a broader agreement with other CSTO members.
In Moscow’s view, despite the gaps in the two final documents, the CSTO’s relevance endures. The Kremlin reiterated its role as a mediator and pledged to exert efforts aimed at bringing Yerevan and Baku to a peace accord within the alliance’s framework, reinforcing that the organization serves as a stabilizing force amid recurring tensions in the region.