The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent in 1992, and exactly a decade later a military-political organization emerged from its framework. Over the years, many changes occurred, including shifts in member states and the broader international stage, with Uzbekistan leaving the CSTO twice and currently not a member.
The evolving landscape was on display at the anniversary summit in the Kremlin on May 16, attended by six leaders representing Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia.
In 2022, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presided over the Collective Security Council, the organization’s top decision body, traveling to Moscow despite protests at home. The Moscow meeting produced a carefully worded statement that stressed unity and a commitment to practical cooperation within the bloc.
After a candid discussion criticizing NATO actions, a surprising moment emerged: CSTO members signaled willingness to engage with the alliance to help de-escalate tensions across Eurasia.
CSTO forces
Collective Rapid Response Forces (CRRF) – 18,000 personnel; Central Asian Region Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF CAR) – 5,000 personnel; Peacekeeping Forces (MS) – 3,600 personnel.
At the summit, allies also condemned any attempt to distort historical records about the joint fight against Nazi aggression and pledged to oppose the glorification of Nazism, racism, and xenophobia in all forms.
Ukraine is not referenced in the final document. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, however, emphasized events in Ukraine as being under Western control. He urged unity in the face of sanctions and hostility, arguing that the CSTO is not as cohesive as it seemed during the Kazakhstan crisis in January.
“If we had acted as a united front earlier, those sanctions might not have hit so hard,” Lukashenko noted. He also argued that Russia should not bear the sole burden of resisting NATO expansion, highlighting the influence of the European Union and China in shaping security dynamics. He pointed to the EU’s discipline and Beijing’s information strategy as instructive examples.
Pashinyan reminded Armenia’s concerns about the stance of some CSTO members in its conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia sought assistance from the CSTO, with the last request dating to 2021 in the Syunik region, but received no immediate response. Armenia also urged Azerbaijan not to sell weapons, a request that went unanswered. Still, Pashinyan expressed gratitude to Russia for help in ending hostilities in Karabakh.
Putin, speaking with a measured tone, described NATO enlargement as an artificial issue arising from Finland and Sweden’s applications. He viewed the move as aligned with U.S. foreign policy interests but did not see direct threats to Russia beyond a potential military infrastructure presence. Moscow, however, pledged to respond to the situation.
Putin also proposed granting observer status in the CSTO to the Commonwealth of Independent States, a move that could theoretically bring in states like Azerbaijan and Ukraine under CSTO mechanisms, though these states are not current CSTO members. The conversation touched on the practicalities and limits of expansion and collaboration within the bloc.
It is worth noting that tensions persist between member states, including historical flashpoints between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2021 and sporadic flareups this year. Yet, the plan calls for continued joint exercises, with Frontier-2022 in Tajikistan and Indestructible Brotherhood-2022 in Kyrgyzstan illustrating ongoing military cooperation.
Is unity possible?
Experts interviewed for socialbites.ca observed that the CSTO has navigated a challenging two decades but gained momentum from its swift response to the January 2022 crisis in Kazakhstan. There, mass protests escalated into unrest, prompting President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to seek CSTO assistance. The peacekeeping mission helped secure critical sites and allowed local security forces to regain control. The mission’s early withdrawal raised questions about the organization’s limits and timeline.
Vladimir Evseev, head of the Eurasian integration and development department at the Institute of CIS Countries, described the CSTO’s trajectory as having faced overambitious expectations. While not everything unfolded as hoped, the organization endured difficult conditions. The Second Karabakh War is seen as a potential turning point that could have pushed Armenia toward withdrawal, a scenario that did not materialize despite domestic criticism. Some members did side with Azerbaijan, yet Russia played a decisive role in supporting Armenia’s security, and the CSTO’s broader purpose remained intact.
The core aim has been the creation of a defense framework that coordinates security efforts across the post-Soviet space. Researchers from the Russian Academy of Sciences noted the initial risks and the long process required to establish a permanent rapid-reaction force capable of addressing internal and external challenges. The most notable achievement remains the rapid deployment to Kazakhstan in January 2022, which stabilized the internal crisis and demonstrated the CSTO’s readiness to respond to evolving threats.
Experts acknowledge that some member states, including Kazakhstan, show cautious reciprocity in responses, signaling that unity in practice remains a work in progress. Disagreements, such as Armenia’s call for greater support in Nagorno-Karabakh and other member states’ considerable leverage with Azerbaijan, illustrate the delicate balance of consensus within a multinational security alliance. Some observers compare this with NATO’s current dynamics, where disagreement and coordination are part of the process rather than signs of weakness.
Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin expressed optimism about future expansion, suggesting the CSTO could eventually grow to dozens of members who value peace and stability. Other analysts from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations emphasize that defense-sector sensitivities will shape any potential enlargement, and clear predictions remain difficult.
According to Evseev, Uzbekistan could return as an observer, given its historically flexible stance within the region, while Turkmenistan is also viewed as a possible observer candidate. The CSTO’s evolving composition continues to attract attention from policymakers, scholars, and security analysts across North America and Europe as they monitor how regional cooperation adapts to new geopolitical realities.