“Nothing has changed for ROC”
A new split is unfolding within Ukrainian Orthodoxy, this time inside the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). At the end of May, its council diverged from Patriarch Kirill’s stance on the Russian military operation and approved amendments to the charter aimed at redefining governance and independence.
The core issue centers on asserting full independence for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Russian Orthodox Church, and introducing provisions that would allow for the restoration of a self-governing structure within Ukraine where autocephaly would be the norm. Several dioceses within the UOC have expressed disagreement with the new direction.
In the Rovenkiv and Sverdlovsk dioceses, located in the territory of the LPR, leaders stated they would remain under the omophorion of Patriarch Kirill and stopped commemorating Kyiv Metropolitan Onufry. Representatives of the Rovenky diocese noted that its presiding bishop, Archbishop Arkady, voted against the council’s decisions.
The same stance was reported in Simferopol and Crimea, Feodosia, Donetsk, Kherson, Gorlovka, and Slavic dioceses of the UOC. The last of these, Metropolitan Mitrofan, said he would continue to commemorate Onufry. He added that the council’s decision was not something he supported, but he had no intention of harming colleagues or the broader church community, and would still commemorate both Metropolitan Onufry and Patriarch Kirill in respectful fashion.
Officially, the council allowed this flexibility: during martial law, diocesan bishops were granted the authority to handle matters affecting the life of their diocese on a case-by-case basis.
Igor Yakimchuk, a senior official in the Moscow Patriarchate’s Foreign Church Relations Department, commented that after the UOC Council’s meeting, the Holy Synod issued a resolution clarifying its stance toward the ROC’s positions on Ukraine.
“What happens next was addressed by the Synod, which concluded that nothing has changed in our relations,” Yakimchuk remarked. The document reportedly expressed broad support for the archpriests, priests, monasteries, and laity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church who face pressure from various groups, from schismatic factions to local authorities, media, and nationalist elements.
From this perspective, the UOC’s status vis-à-vis the ROC appears largely unchanged. The historical framework anchored in the 1990 All-Russian Diploma by Alexy and Moscow recognized the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s right to independence and self-rule, a stance that continues to influence current interpretations.
Some officials in the UOC suggested that the changes to the charter reflect a reluctance to sever ties entirely. Metropolitan Kliment, head of the UOC’s Synodal and Educational Department, indicated that edits to the charter were not a mere cosmetic shift. “As for bishops who declined to follow the council’s decisions, such action is lawful since the council granted diocesan bishops authority to decide cases individually,” Yakimchuk explained.
independence or schismatic
On May 27, 2022, the UOC Council, the church’s highest governing body, convened in Kyiv to discuss church life amid Russia’s special operation in Ukraine. Some leaders urged a peaceful stance, emphasizing the obligation to protect life and calling on church leadership to do what is possible to halt bloodshed. In that moment, Kirill described Ukraine’s military actions as a clash spurred by forces seeking to fracture brotherhood and reminded soldiers of their oaths, while urging restraint to prevent further suffering.
The council then adopted amendments to the UOC Statute that signaled a push toward greater independence for the Ukrainian church. A spokesperson stated that procedures removing ties between the UOC and the Moscow Patriarchate had been outlined, signaling a shift in governance rather than a complete break. The Kyiv Metropolis signaled steps toward restoring a more autonomous religious life, a move tied to historical practices and canons that influenced church leadership across the region.
The ROC did not publicly criticize this decision, and observers noted that the UOC continues to navigate a careful path between autonomy and reported connections to Moscow. Some scholars view the council’s actions as an attempt to preserve unity within the church, especially in areas affected by conflict, while still maintaining a recognizable link to the Moscow Patriarchate.
Experts highlighted that the council’s approach is likely part of a broader strategy to safeguard church unity in war-torn zones and in territories where ranging governance structures exist, including Crimea. The decision can be seen as a nuanced stance, balancing the desire for independence with the practical realities of regional fragmentation.
There is speculation about how political pressures shape church policy. A bill to ban the UOC circulated in parliament, and in some locales, the organization faced local government restrictions. Yet, observers point out that the council’s framework to act on a case-by-case basis could serve as a means to preserve the church’s presence and influence across contested regions.
Will the UOC and OCU talk?
The council also expressed hope for renewed dialogue with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (OCU) to bridge the divide that has emerged since unification in Kyiv at the end of 2018. The OCU received autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate early in 2019, but neither the ROC nor the UOC recognizes the OCU as a reconciled part of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The council underscored the shared concern about unity and the pain the schism has caused within the church body.
Several conditions were proposed to start a dialogue, including calls for the OCU to stop appropriating UOC temples and to resolve questions of canonicity around OCU hierarchs. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC-MP reportedly oversaw about 12,000 congregations, compared to roughly 7,000 for the OCU. The exchange of measures and terms for dialogue reflected a willingness to engage, albeit with clear boundaries.
On May 26, the UOC appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to request the dethronement of Patriarch Kirill. OCU leaders criticized Kirill for supporting the military operation and accused him of spreading doctrinal errors. Commentators note that the rhetoric around dialogue remains heavily symbolic, with real tensions complicating any path toward reconciliation.
Romuald Lunkin, a scholar at the European Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, suggested that while the council’s pronouncements influence the situation, they do not guarantee a complete rupture with Moscow. The UOC remains in a two-pronged position, balancing autocephaly claims with ties to the Moscow Patriarchate. Lunkin described the church as continuing to grapple with where ultimate authority resides, especially given Kyiv’s central role in Ukrainian ecclesiastical life. The dual stance becomes clearer when it is noted that Kyiv is described as the church’s control center, even as regional structures continue to align with Moscow in some cases.
Ultimately, experts believe the council’s actions aim to preserve unity among dioceses under siege, while preparing for possible shifts in canonic relations. Political developments, including legislative measures, contribute to a climate in which church leaders must navigate competing loyalties and community expectations. The path forward is uncertain, but the dialogue between Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdictions continues to evolve in response to both domestic and international pressures.
In summary, the current moment reflects a church divided not by doctrine alone but by geography and politics. The UOC-MP’s strategic moves signal a preference for maintaining structured relationships within Orthodox governance while acknowledging local desires for greater self-rule in Ukraine. The coming months will reveal whether these moves yield a lasting compromise or accelerate the emergence of a more distinctly autocephalous Ukrainian church.