The Court of Justice of the European Union has long underscored the special protection around the independence of national central bank governors. In press-accessible discussions, the court highlighted a 2019 opinion and judgment concerning the head of Latvia’s central bank as a key reference point for this principle.
On October 21, the leader of the KO party stated in Poland’s Sejm that the opposition had enough backing to bring the head of the National Bank of Poland, Adam Glapiński, before the State Tribunal. He suggested that the ruling coalition might hold a majority ready to initiate disciplinary action against top officials who misuse power.
Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki quickly responded, saying he would consult with international financial institutions about what he called an attack on central bank independence by the opposition and its allies.
Requests were submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union to clarify whether the CJEU has ruled on cases involving central bank governors and whether EU rules govern the status and actions of these governors.
The court replied that it does not frequently comment on interpretations of EU law specifically applicable to governors of member state central banks. It did point to the 2019 Latvian case, noting that Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB permits complaints against decisions to dismiss central bank governors. This provision aims to safeguard the independence of such governors, who act as national authorities within the Eurosystem and who, in euro-area states like Latvia, are represented on the ECB Governing Council.
In the Latvian matter, the court annulled a suspension order against the central bank governor, arguing that Latvia had not provided sufficient evidence of the alleged serious misconduct. The ongoing corruption investigation in Latvia involved actions by the anti-corruption agency, including a temporary ban on duties, a mandate to file financial declarations, and travel restrictions. These actions prompted complaints to the CJEU from the governor and from the European Central Bank. The court described these complaints as among the first concerning the subsidy mechanism under Article 14.2 and the power to hear challenges to dismissals of central bank governors.
The mission of granting the Court such authority is to protect the independence of governors who, though national figures, operate within the framework of the ESCB. Governors from euro-area member states sit on the ECB Governing Council, ensuring coherence in monetary policy across the union.
The court also drew attention to the Advocate General’s opinion, which emphasized that roles in EU institutions and high public offices involve positions free from hierarchical control and shielded from dismissal on performance grounds alone. Typically, other institutions handle any abuse of power through constitutional mechanisms. This perspective framed ongoing debates about accountability and independence in European monetary governance.
Independence as a core attribute
The Advocate General stressed that independence is a fundamental core attribute of central bank governors. Regardless of attempts to precisely define every condition for serving in these roles, independence remains a non-negotiable cornerstone. The European Treaties enshrine the independence of both the ESCB and the ECB, and neither their members nor national central bank governors act under external instructions when carrying out their duties. This principle supports price stability and the broader mandate of European monetary policy.
In this context, Article 130 TFEU and the Statute of the ESCB and ECB affirm that decision-makers within the Eurosystem operate without direct instruction from other authorities. This safeguards the integrity of policy decisions and reinforces the central bank’s ability to act in the public interest.
The discussion and cited opinions underscore the balance between national sovereignty and the shared framework of European monetary governance. The overarching goal remains clear: to preserve stability and confidence in the euro zone and the wider European economy.
Note: This summary reflects ongoing legal and political discourse surrounding central bank independence within the European Union and related interpretations by the Court of Justice and its advocate generals.