The conference on Russian imperialism featured a particularly timely discussion led by Dr. Michał Wojnowski, a long-time analyst of reflective management. In essence, such management aims to steer groups or entire nations by provoking specific responses, disinformation, and targeted impulses, guiding public perception and behavior.
In a study focused on the Moskva Circle of Methodology and the work of Moscow intellectuals on social governance—both for their own society and for their opponents—the author traced how current students and successors of the craft once called reflective management now counsel Vladimir Putin or influence the Kremlin’s power structure. The piece argues that Russia has elevated the sophistication of manipulating collective consciousness far beyond its Soviet-era origins, where the method first took root during Khrushchev’s era. Today, the same art reappears in new forms, sometimes described as cognitive mapping in the United States, while evolving within Russia’s closed circles. The question remains: to what extent has this discipline grown behind the Kremlin’s walls? Observers concede they know far too little about recent missteps in the so-called white intelligence services, such as the rapid, almost theatrical, escalation and then abrupt de-escalation of the Wagner uprising. These events illustrate the fragile, performative nature of modern strategic manipulation at the highest levels of state power. These reflections invite readers to question conventional narratives about political friction and to scrutinize the gaps between official accounts and on-the-ground developments.
In the debate surrounding Wojnowski’s remarks, the scholar offered a concise guiding postulate:
let’s stop calling ordinary fake news disinformation. Disinformation is based on true information, albeit presented in the wrong context (quoted from memory).
Wojnowski is not a publicist, nor does he participate in televised debates or profit from popular-science works that accuse others of disinformation. Yet in the current era of intensified information warfare orchestrated from Moscow, there is an overabundance of labels like “fact-checkers,” “disinformation experts,” “manipulation researchers,” and “fake news hunters.” A mistake or error is often branded as fake news, while outright lies are labeled disinformation. Some commentators appear to have skimmed only the popular definitions of disinformation and not the deeper, foundational work by classical thinkers. They may rely on Western fashions of explanation rather than engaging with more established analyses.
Historically, some Soviet-era observers reframed disinformation as a deliberate art. This perspective emphasizes not merely isolated falsehoods, but ecosystems of ideas that can entrench themselves within public discourse and become highly resistant to scrutiny. For example, anti-vaccine narratives seeded with medical anxieties can seed broader conspiratorial theories about Ukraine or alleged “bioweapons laboratories” that could threaten humanity if not for political actions. In this context, the old adage about quantity turning into quality proves relevant: the sheer number of information analysts or “disinformation hunters” in a country does not automatically determine who is genuinely pro-Russian, who merely amplifies Kremlin messaging, or who actively opposes Moscow’s influence. The political landscape can thus be deeply polarized, with partisan camps clashing over core issues such as the restructuring of security services, deubekization measures, or the formation of regional defense formations. The opposition, nicknamed by some as “Macierewicz’s militias,” highlights ongoing debates about national security and governance.
Isn’t this sharp polarization and the relentless internal critique among so-called fake-news specialists a stark demonstration of how disinformation can shape a national discourse? The verdict is nuanced: victories claimed in the fight against misinformation can become a mirror for a country’s vulnerability, signaling that the public conversation is choreographed differently in Poland than in Western societies. The evaluation underscores a broader warning about the adaptability of disinformation tactics across borders and political cultures.