The book being discussed is Carrero, 50 years of a cursed assassination. Aren’t all assassinations cursed?
Comparing Carrero’s killing with Prim’s attacks in 1870 reveals striking parallels. From the moment the first large swords were drawn in that era, the Carrero investigation followed a familiar path: blank pages, pressure on judges, and political indifference at the very top. The powers that be showed no interest in uncovering the truth. The result is a cursed assassination because the family never learned who was behind it.
Reexamining the assassination: what does this half-century later tell us about Carrero’s death?
From day one ETA claimed responsibility. But the author adds a significant angle that has not been thoroughly explored: how did ETA gain access to Carrero’s daily life and the names of those who carried out the attack? The narrative points to a web of connections, including PCE dissidents like Eva Forest and Alfonso Sastre, who connected with and supplied new information about a key figure the book highlights, Ugalde Aguirresarobe, also known as Kaskazuri. This figure links La Sombra to Argala, yet Kaskazuri was never detained or questioned, and there was little effort to identify the Shadow. The author suggests this silence may reflect the regime’s surprise at his involvement. Newly declassified U.S. documents are presented to challenge the notion that Carrero led the government, reinforcing the idea that the truth remained obscured.
The claim is made that La Sombra supplied information to ETA operatives at the Mindanao hotel. Will the full identity ever be revealed?
Historians debate whether La Sombra truly existed. The author recounts a 2001 meeting in Vitoria with Wilson, describing La Sombra as a man around 35 years old, about 1.70 meters tall, with gelled hair and immaculate attire. This profile, provided by Wilson at the Mindanao hotel, ties the figure to the Watergate era just before Deep Throat’s death. The 50th anniversary prompts speculation about what might come to light, given ETA’s knowledge, Forest and Sastre’s circles, and the crucial role the Shadow played in the attack.
How could a commando, responsible for several missteps, manage to kill the Head of Government during the Franco regime?
The Madrid operation cannot be understood without fresh information and efforts to probe the basement on Claudia Coello Street. It is revealed that a group of relatively inexperienced militants planned an attack in Madrid for a year, constructing a basement in a secluded area just 100 meters from the American Embassy, aligning with Kissinger’s visit. Flats were rented, guns bought, a bar gun left on a counter, and ETA leaders gathered in a Getafe apartment to coordinate. The author reflects on having studied Madrid at the time, noting how extraordinary these preparations appeared then.
“Kill the president”: Who helped ETA in Carrero Blanco’s murder?
What role did the regime play?
The forces aligned with El Pardo and the Falangist far right pushed for Carrero’s protection to rest with Interior Minister Arias Navarro.
Yet the secret services seemed to be under Carrero’s control.
In 1972, Carrero’s own secret service, Seced, was created, but the regime worried more about university students, red priests, trade unions, and Freemasonry than about ETA. The author argues that Carrero did not command a vast, all-seeing spy network focused on personal intrigues. Only Commissioner Sainz showed any real capacity to probe ETA, sending warnings that a Madrid-based ETA commando was planning something large, yet no action followed. This suggests Carrero’s enemies within the regime and allied circles in the United States bore some responsibility for overlooking a serious threat.
Nevertheless, the possibility of direct U.S. intervention is dismissed…
No direct involvement is claimed for the CIA. The United States reportedly recognized Carrero’s leadership in negotiations for renewing arms treaties and opposed certain American-demanded conditions. Tensions surfaced during Kissinger’s meeting with Carrero, especially over base use, arms supply, and the implications of the Yom Kippur War. The narrative notes the strain this created between Madrid and Washington.
“There is no evil that does not come with goodness,” Franco reportedly said after the attack. If one must assign responsibility for who benefited most, who would that be?
Those who gained the most were the political right, opposed to Carrero. The regime and the Falangists failed to see eye to eye, yet Spain had already charted a path toward a Transition. Democracy benefited the most from Carrero’s death, with the greatest gains accruing to those who held power from January 1974 onward. The terrorist organization itself received little benefit from amnesty up to 1977.
Why is access to reserved documents in Spain so difficult?
The country’s Official Secrets Act of 1968 remains in effect, and only a handful of documents have been declassified through judicial decisions. There is little distinction made between different political administrations, which fuels ongoing opacity.
Carrero Blanco’s wife, María Victoria Martínez-Hombre, was found dead in her Asturias apartment
What explains the persistent lack of transparency?
State control over secret services persisted as successive governments inherited the legacy, and a genuine desire to uncover the truth never materialized.
Why don’t new generations understand what Transition means or who Carrero was?
The author argues that education policy has failed to teach the costs involved in achieving democracy. He recalls political figures from Podemos speaking too casually about how the Transition was achieved. He notes personal experiences at university, where the path to democracy required resilience and sacrifice, whereas the younger generation seemed to miss that foundational struggle.
So where do things stand half a century later?
The period was marked by moments of tension, such as the 23F coup attempt, the Atocha Street bombing, and a sequence of ETA attacks. Yet there were red lines that were never crossed. No president ever formed a government with Bildu or Catalan independence advocates to oversee appointments, a line that remained uncrossed.