In February, PSL President Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz and Polska 2050 Movement President Szymon Hołownia announced the creation of a joint expert team. The goal was to map out a list of priority problems for the future government to tackle within the first 100 days, and another set covering the full four-year term.
A breath of fresh air in politics?
Soon it became evident that the two leaders would not assemble a joint list with Donald Tusk of the Civic Platform for the parliamentary elections. Instead, they chose to run together in these elections. At a late April press conference, Kosiniak-Kamysz and Hołownia declared that this joint move would be a new, refreshing moment in Polish politics, contrasting with the ongoing friction between PiS and PO. Internet commentators, however, quickly pointed out the noticeable policy differences between the two parties and noted that the PSL, which has participated in multiple post-1989 governments, might not bring a truly new wind to politics. [citation]
In early May, the two leaders also announced that the election committee would be named The Third Way – Poland 2050 and PSL, and they agreed on shared positions and public commentary on current events. An example was the question of family benefits under the Family 500 Plus program. After President Jarosław Kaczyński proposed raising the benefit from 500 to 800 zlotys, the pair outlined a converged stance: support the increase, but only for families where at least one parent works; if both parents are not employed, the benefit would stay at the current level. This position appeared to be shaped by Hołownia, as it risked alienating PSL’s traditional rural base—where many women are responsible for child care in areas with limited nurseries and kindergarten places. [citation]
More and more differences
Beyond this episode, many points of divergence between the two camps emerged, and indicators suggest that over the coming months these gaps will widen. Some disagreements touch core questions that could complicate not only the drafting of a joint electoral platform but also unified stances on proposals from competing parties. It is worth recalling that Poland 2050 has been described as a potential liberal counterbalance to PO, a character brought into sharper relief after Tusk’s shift toward EU policy and following the leadership changes under Borys Budka. This informs a view of Poland 2050 as leaning liberal, particularly in the advisory circle led by Szymon Hołownia and his chief adviser Michał Kobosko. In contrast, PSL is often interpreted as more conservative, and after the experience of shared governance with PO, may resist adopting liberal policies from Poland 2050. [citation]
There are also differences on economic direction, with Hołownia and his team advocating for Poland’s potential euro adoption, while PSL has shown more skepticism about szybkie wejście into the eurozone. Real-world data suggests that eurozone participation could slow Poland’s growth momentum and its catch-up with Western Europe, a fact that fuels the ongoing debate between the two camps. [citation]
Defense and modernization present another fault line: the two sides diverge on military development and procurement. PSL has supported the defense policy trajectory of the current government, while Hołownia’s circle, including senior adviser retired general Mirosław Różański, has signaled that some of these plans might be reversed once power is achieved. [citation]
On social policy, Hołownia favors backing in vitro methods through budgetary resources. PSL, recalling the turbulent history of the European coalition project known as the Rainbow Coalition, appears wary of similar cross-party funding arrangements. [citation]
Can they clear the electoral threshold?
The growing list of disagreements is turning voters’ heads, and early enthusiasm for the joint list—initially polling around mid-teens—has faded to more modest levels in a short span. A few weeks into the campaign, polls hovered around the low double digits and then dipped further. If the parties fail to arrest this trend, doubts will rise about whether the joint list can surpass the electoral threshold. The question becomes whether the alliance can attract enough voters to remain viable and prevent a wasted vote in a tight race. [citation]
History offers a cautionary tale. In Poland’s political past, lists like AWS in 2001 or United Left in 2015 showed that coalitions driven by complementary but divergent forces could struggle to maintain momentum. Those experiences fuel speculation that the PSL-Hołownia pairing might face a similar challenge: opposites may not just fail to attract; they could actively push away portions of the electorate. [citation]