The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union shows that the independence of the governors of national central banks enjoys special protection. In the information sent to PAP, the CJEU press service draws attention to the 2019 Opinion and Judgment on the Head of the Latvian Central Bank.
On October 21, KO leader Donald Tusk said in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland that the opposition had the majority to bring NBP President Adam Glapiński to the State Tribunal.
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Tusk’s threats
At this point, we have a majority vote sufficient to summon the NBP President to the State Tribunal. We are analyzing this issue because we want to use this very serious disciplinary tool responsibly to establish political and sometimes criminal liability of politicians and top officials.
– Tusk emphasized.
In response, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki stated that he would talk to representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Central Bank – to draw their attention to the fact that the announcements of Donald Tusk and the Civic Coalition “the biggest attack on the independence of the central bank”.
PAP asked the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg whether the CJEU has ever ruled in cases involving central bank governors in the EU and whether there are EU regulations regarding central bank governors?
In response, the Court’s press service noted that the CJEU had not had much opportunity to comment on the interpretation of EU law as it applies to the governors of Member States’ central banks. However, it drew attention to the judgment of February 26, 2019 on the suspension of the head of the Latvian Central Bank. Articles were mentioned in it. 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB, which provides that the Governor of a national central bank may be removed from office only if he no longer fulfills the conditions necessary for the performance of his duties or has been guilty of serious misconduct.
In a case almost five years ago, the Court annulled the decision suspending the Governor of the Central Bank of Latvia from his position. As he argued, Latvia has not provided evidence of the serious misconduct of which Ilmars Rimshevicz was accused.
As part of the investigation against him for corruption and paid patronage, the Latvian anti-corruption agency imposed a number of measures on Rimsheviczs, including a ban on the performance of his duties as central bank governor, the obligation to file a financial declaration to be submitted guarantee and a ban on leaving the country without prior permission.
Complaints against these decisions have been submitted to the CJEU by both the interested party and the European Central Bank. In the introduction to the judgment, the CJEU stated that these were the first complaints filed with the Court of Justice of the EU regarding the subsidy granted to it under Art. 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB “power to hear complaints against decisions to dismiss governors of the central banks of the Member States”.
The purpose of conferring this power on the Court is to guarantee the independence of the governors of the national central banks, who are undoubtedly national authorities but operate within the ESCB. The governors of the national central banks of a Member State whose currency is the euro, as is the case with Latvia, also sit on the Governing Council of the ECB
– emphasized the CJEU.
The CJEU press service also drew attention to the opinion of CJEU Advocate General Juliane Kokott prior to the judgment.
The German lawyer pointed out that “the positions of members of the EU institutions and the highest public positions in the Member States are inherent in the fact that the persons holding these positions are not subject to any hierarchical control and cannot be dismissed for reasons relating to the performance of their functions.”
Therefore, the repressive powers to punish any abuse of power by someone holding such a position usually rest with the institution to which he or she belongs, or with another institution of constitutionally equivalent status.
– we read in the advice.
““Independence is the inviolable core”:
Going further, Kokott emphasized that “even without attempting to exhaustively define the conditions necessary to serve as central bank governors, it must be said that independence is at least their inviolable core.”
(…) the independence of the national central banks belonging to the ESCB, as well as the members of the Governing Council of the ECB, as the main decision-making body of this bank and the Eurosystem, is enshrined in the TFEU as an essential factor for price stability , which is the main objective of the economic and monetary policy of the Union and the ESCB. For this reason, art. 130 TFEU and art. Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB expressly provides that neither members of any decision-making body of the ECB nor national central banks, in exercising the powers, tasks and duties conferred on them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ECB have been instructed, The ESCB and the ECB neither seek nor take instructions from any authority
– she explained.
gah/PAP
Source: wPolityce