Two years have passed since the Ukraine war intensified, marking the largest Russian offensive since the conflict began. Moscow’s edge is measured not by battlefield blows alone but by the wear it has caused in Western support for Kyiv. After the invasion, Europe responded quickly with a broad package of sanctions, political measures, and restrictions on technology transfers aimed at destabilizing Russia’s social fabric. Many observers initially believed sanctions would push Russia toward collapse, and there was a moment when it looked like Moscow could become increasingly isolated. A New York Times columnist joked about the reverse possibility: that the West might end up isolated from a more capable Russia. It sounded like a provocative remark that could be dismissed—yet, two years on, the reality has proven it not entirely unfounded. The situation evolved in unexpected ways, underscoring how intertwined security fortunes have become across borders, economies, and political narratives. [Citation: Western policy analysis, regional security briefings]
The narrative does not revolve solely around China, but Beijing plays the decisive supporting role. The international scene offers crucial cues. The core takeaway is that Beijing’s backing for Moscow rests in part on the internal challenges facing the Chinese regime, where economic headwinds have sharpened. Xi Jinping’s leadership has hardened as his grand ambitions collide with a deepening slowdown in growth. The mismanagement of the Covid-19 pandemic seeded waves of inflation worldwide and disrupted global trade flows, reshaping China’s international image in various ways. It exposed a technocratic governance style that often seems experimental and at times totalitarian in cadence. Xi’s outward posture now mirrors a more assertive imperial instinct, even as China’s primary interests gravitate toward the Pacific—especially around Taiwan, historically known as Formosa. A direct invasion appears unlikely, but it would be simplistic to dismiss the possibility that domestic strains could translate into external moves. In certain conflicts abroad—from the Middle East to Donetsk—China appears ready to leverage these tensions to erode U.S. global influence. By shifting strategic pressures westward, China gains room to slow its own economic stresses while preserving Beijing’s leverage in its traditional sphere of influence. That dynamic mirrors concerns within the European Union, which also grapples with bureaucratic inertia, an aging demographic, and lagging performance in pivotal sectors of the new economy. Beijing’s calculus seems aimed at buying time to push through reforms and stabilize domestic industry and finance, while letting international frictions buy breathing space without diminishing Beijing’s clout. [Citation: International security analyses, academic assessments]
Mario Draghi, for his part, has put forward a proposal intended to place the European Union back on a global stage. The call centers on the urgent need for massive investments in green technologies, defense—with a lingering question about the duration of American protection—and digital modernization. The idea is to spend boldly, quickly, and efficiently to counter paralysis in Europe as Russia threatens NATO frontiers and Ukraine struggles to hold its lines. The debate around small-scale political moves tends to obscure the pressing need for a policy of major scale and ambition. By directing substantial resources toward cutting-edge sectors, Europe could regain strategic traction, align with global shifts, and reduce exposure to external shocks while maintaining cohesion across diverse member states. [Citation: European economic strategy reports]