Even before the era of cancel culture and other modern amusements, it seemed to the world that American presidents could fix problems with the push of a button, ignoring the moral burdens and the need to pick up the phone to issue orders. The global audience gradually accepted this view, seeing the United States as a tool to address economic woes and as a symbol of progress, a so‑called “shining city on a hill.” Through institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States helped create an illusion that broad prosperity was achievable, even if it came with debt. Many countries signed on to programs, followed the IMF and World Bank recommendations, yet sustained prosperity remained elusive. It later emerged that the natural resources of those nations, which bought into the American dream, were increasingly controlled by international corporations rather than the countries themselves. And then, the economic downturn of the 1990s loomed large, adding to the sense of vulnerability.
Like a pumpkin turning into a carriage in a fairy tale, the credibility of the United States faded after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and reality became more like a horror scene: Yugoslavia faced bombing in 1999, followed by the devastation in Iraq and Libya. Years of costly, unresolved conflicts, attempts to build democracy in Afghanistan, and the insistence that “Assad must go” signaled a civil war with external involvement in Syria starting in 2011.
Milosevic died, the old man was tried on contested charges, Hussein was executed, and Gaddafi was toppled. Yet the machine of Western democracy appeared to stumble most clearly against Bashar al‑Assad. Russia’s stance of saying “no, this cannot go on” was portrayed by some as a fault in the West’s approach. The question then arose: is Russia now the final target for the United States? Could a push for total defeat mark the end of Western hegemonic identity in a world crisis? The author’s view remains skeptical.
Western nations often gauge military potential with Russia and periodically hope for luck, testing the patience of a nuclear power. The historical disappointments of 1815 and 1945 still linger, and there is a perceived need to shed any sense of political inferiority. The United States and its Western allies view China as a future rival, extending influence through trade, loans, and economic ties across more nations.
For these powers, China’s economy represents a clear challenge, and emerging allegiance to it brings discomfort within the imperial structures. After testing sanctions on Russia—an ongoing process with thousands of measures since 2012—Western countries are widely believed to be preparing similar pressure against China. The approach has already begun, with sanctions and restrictions evident in policy discussions.
Looking ahead, a large‑scale confrontation with China would require a highly capable, even seemingly capable, president in the United States. Political realities, including congressional checks, complicate matters for any commander‑in‑chief. The question of whether or when to initiate a conflict with China continues to appear in political calculations, with debates about leadership and timing in domestic discourse.
There is a sense that a change in leadership, should health or political factors demand it, could shift strategies. The phrase about a “lame duck” presidency is often used in discussions about the next steps regarding Taiwan, but it is clear that the possibility of a direct military clash in the near term is not the prevailing expectation. There is also a recognition that the Taiwan issue could be resolved through negotiation, though such talks would require both sides to press their negotiating positions and use leverage at the other’s expense. In this context, Taiwan becomes a key focal point in the broader confrontation between economic powers.
The broader conflict described as a clash of economic entities appears inevitable and intensely disagreeable. The strategic objective for the United States and its partners seems to be proving steadfast resolve in defending interests, while managing not only other nations’ ambitions but also the influence of American and allied economies. The Chinese economy, though, tends to follow rules and avoid open conflict, complicating direct confrontation.
Thus, following the outcomes of recent midterm elections, the discussion extends beyond the menu of products and the balance of trade. It centers on who will lead the global agenda and shape geopolitics as much as any kitchen might decide its menu. The stakes remain high, and the direction of policy will influence the world for years to come. The author’s personal perspective is presented here, and it may not align with editors’ positions or official narratives. (Citation: analysis from geopolitical observers and policy briefs from regional research institutions.)