A member of parliament with a stern countenance recently proposed that Russia’s population should double to 290 million within fifty years, and he reportedly has a plan for how to achieve this growth. The measures he outlined sound modest next to the scale of the project: restricting or banning abortion, adjusting maternity benefits and family policies, offering social incentives, and expanding nurseries and kindergartens, among a few other points.
At times, one can be struck by the formal seriousness with which improbable ideas are presented. The underlying premise is clear: to double the population, every Russian woman would need to bear four children on average within roughly nine months per birth, and this rhythm would have to continue for half a century. In theory, it might be possible to organize facilities that would require fertility among women of childbearing age, but those plans were not openly discussed by the MP.
The issue of Russia’s birth rate is indeed troubling, yet it should not be treated as a springboard for far-fetched schemes when the focus is the presidency. The problem of falling birth rates as wealth and education rise is not unique to Russia. Population tends to age globally, and in many developed countries the trend is pronounced. The world has a right to manage population growth in a way that avoids overburdening resources. A provocative suggestion is to consider Mars as a new frontier for expansion and reproduction.
Turning to current figures, immigration alone no longer counters the natural decline in Russia’s population. Last year’s net population change was nearly 600,000, with the previous year showing a higher figure. This shift reflects broader demographic pressures and the lingering effects of the pandemic.
The number of women of reproductive age is shrinking, and last year it hovered around 34 million. Projections for January 2031 place that figure at about 32.6 million. The birth rate sits near 1.5, which is only modestly encouraging and remains well below the replacement level of about 2.0. With such dynamics, it is not feasible to achieve a simple “reproduction doubling.” Questions arise about how a system might inspire each woman to bear four children instead of roughly one and a half.
There is no straightforward remedy for this challenge. Demography is a long game; forecasts can be set decades ahead, but dramatic shifts are rarely achieved quickly. History offers cautionary examples. For instance, China’s one-child policy, abandoned in recent years, led to an aging population, a shrinking workforce, and rising numbers of retirees. If trends continue, projections suggest China’s population could fall significantly, potentially aligning with the population of the United States in the latter part of the century.
Viewed through this lens, China is not a youthful, growing power but an aging one, and that aging profile could shape its global behavior. This factor may also influence any considerations of territorial expansion that rely on a large, young demographic.
In Russia, demographic forecasts remain sobering. All major models anticipate population decline through 2100. UN projections put the population at around 112 million by the end of the century, a position that would rank Russia twentieth globally. More optimistic assessments from leading demographic institutes suggest it could hold steady around 137 million, while worst-case scenarios see numbers closer to 106 million. The birth rate is not expected to rise substantially in the near term.
Immigration as a factor to offset natural decline is likely to weaken as birth rates slow in donor countries and as economic conditions shift. The migration flow has already slowed, influenced by historical conflicts and currency depreciation. While labor needs exist in other regions, most migration may head to richer parts of the world, though some movement toward Russia could persist. Forecasts show migration growing gradually in the coming years, but not enough to fully offset natural decline.
Policy options to stabilize fertility are discussed, including increasing maternity benefits and creating favorable conditions for families. A crucial element is shaping a hopeful image of the future that encourages family formation. Immigration can play a role when aligned with the country’s needs, but such measures alone cannot reverse a demographic downturn.
Unrealistic proposals that involve large-scale territorial expansion are not supported by historical experience. Countries facing population decline and aging often struggle to sustain geopolitical ambitions that depend on a young workforce. In the case of regional dynamics, neighbors and nearby nations also present demographic contrasts that complicate any drastic shifts. The context of Central Asia is mentioned, with several countries showing relatively high birth rates and sizable populations that differ markedly from Russia’s pace. The idea of pursuing demographic gains by expanding into these regions is intriguing but raises practical and ethical questions. Ultimately, the demographic picture for Russia remains complex, with significant challenges ahead in sustaining growth and supporting a balanced age structure throughout the century.