Spain entered a period of deindustrialization starting in the 1980s. When the country joined the European Community, a weakened competitive position combined with a rising service economy and the momentum of globalization. Incoming European funds and a youthful, ambitious population helped obscure the negative effects of this shift for decades. As multinational buyers snapped up factories at low prices, manufacturing moved eastward to Asia, while real estate boomed, infrastructures expanded, and the financial sector grew dominant. Leading firms in electricity, telecommunications, textiles, and banking extended their reach into Latin America, generating rapid profits during the bubble years. From the democratization era through the subprime crisis, the country modernized in many respects, yet industry contracted and competitiveness deteriorated. Time has made the pattern easier to see. What looked like a smart bet on services at the moment proved fragile in hindsight. The nation’s enrichment rested on imprecise foundations. These mistakes were not unique to Spain. Across much of southern Europe, including France, a similar diagnosis emerges, though the starting points differ. The United Kingdom found itself trapped in a tougher position, and London’s rise as a global city came at a cost to rest of the country.
The loss of industrial power did more than erode human capital and national economic strength; it also gave rise to political strains. A recent commentary in El País by Wolfgang Münchau noted that “the decline of the center and deindustrialization are closely linked,” explaining that “the social fabric supporting the center has dissolved.” The explanation is partly economic, yet not reducible to numbers alone. In postwar Europe, industry offered lifelong employment, secure pensions, and stable social structures. Industrial areas grew around large facilities, and communities took root in their local environments. This is why Germans speak of the Industriegesellschaft, an industrial society with a distinctive lifestyle, not merely an economic model.
The erosion of centrism reflects, in large measure, a failed reform agenda and the rise of populist currents. In many nations, including Spain, electoral politics increasingly supplanted rational debate. Short-term gains were pursued with a mindset that insisted, often with confident rhetoric, that “this time will be different.” Yet history shows that practiced behavior tends to stay stubbornly consistent. What seems sensible a year from now may lose its appeal once looked at with fresh eyes. As Western societies confront the persistence of old vices, the middle class and the working class face growing instability. The easy linkage between economic performance and political life becomes harder to deny. The transition away from a predominantly industrial society, a hallmark of the postwar era, has produced a more fragmented world marked by disenchantment and resentment. The narrative that once tied prosperity to tangible production has given way to a more dispersed economy, where services, finance, and digital value chains shape outcomes in unexpected ways.