King and investment. first move

Among us, it is the Congress of Representatives that puts its trust not in a ministerial team, but in the leader of the future team appointed and appointed (not appointed) by the King. recommends to the Head of State the members of his Government, Before such an appointment takes place, it is unknown to both the Assembly and the Sovereign. The King, however, is no stranger to the journey of appointment, as it is up to him to “propose the nominee for Head of Government and appoint him when appropriate, and at the same time terminate his duties in government.” Conditions stipulated in the Constitution” (art. 62 d]). As for the other members of the government, the King appoints and separates them on the proposal of the President (arts. 62 e]and 100). Secondly, since it is a regulated and legal act for the Sovereign, the same does not happen in the royal bid of candidates for appointment, who eventually have more discretion.

According to article 99.1 of CE, “After each renewal of the Congress of Deputies and in other constitutional cases in which it continues (i.e. when Congress rejects a question of confidence raised by the Head of Government, or a resignation or death: articles 101.1, 112 and 114.1), the King shall have representation in parliament. The correct interpretation of this rule, and ultimately of the margin of freedom of movement because of the constitutional precautionary function of the Head of State, is inseparable from the other provisions of Article 99. Indeed, 1) if the proposed candidate gains the confidence of Congress by a simple majority of its members, the King will appoint him as Head of Government; 2) if that majority is not achieved, the proposal will be voted on after 48 hours, in which case a simple majority will suffice (without counting abstentions or void votes, against) more favorable votes than votes); 3) successive royal proposals will be processed until two months have passed from the first vote, if nonetheless confidence has been given for the investment; after this period “The King shall dissolve both Houses and call new elections with the consent of the House.” President of the Congress” (art. 99.5).

As Head of Government in a Parliamentary Monarchy Never needs the king’s trust, Royal offering capabilities embedded neither in the attainment of office nor in the performance of that office, its function or its reserve, are intended to be fully submitted to Congress in accordance with the consultations held. and, according to other sources of information, a candidate who can gain the Chamber’s trust in the first or second round. This must have been the sole aim of the King, and the exemplary institutional experience since the 1978 Constitution came into force confirms this. In short, the proposal faculty is in any case an “associated force” and can never be a force independent of the will of Congress, although the Circumstances make it a “predictive” force.

Therefore, if there is a candidate with an absolute majority, the King has to propose it, he cannot propose another. Likewise, and as a logical development, according to the consultations, the King is not allowed to propose as a candidate who evokes majority opposition in Congress. However, it seems no less certain that where the parliamentary will is valid, its reserve function requires a proactive behavior of the Monarchy, leading to the fulfillment of the parliamentary will in order to promote inter-party dialogue within the framework of complete impartiality. did not occur. However, if no speaker of the House accepts the King’s proposal or abandons it after a while (which is perfectly legal in my opinion) the situation will be stuck, as it will not be possible to refer to the provisions. CE Art. 99.5 without at least one unsuccessful initial vote. This is where the mentioned constitutional rule shows its greatest shortcoming, because in order to avoid all contingencies, the term must undoubtedly be counted from the statutes of the Chamber, which can only be achieved by reforming the Constitution. This being the case, it is worth asking whether the Head of State can propose a previously known candidate who cannot gain the confidence of the House, only to set the path for new elections in motion. I see no objection to the constitutional appointment procedure, and it does not seem to me to be a distortion (since the presentation and discussion of the candidate’s program always pursues a persuasive goal whose outcome, ironically, is not predetermined), but provided that the leader is assumed for this purpose, one of the two major national parties, the King It is not possible for ‘s to appoint the leader of a minority party or even a third party from outside Congress (eg a prestigious technician); this would, in the first instance, distort the true purpose of the procedure in question and, in the second, jeopardize royal impartiality.

Felipe VI nominated popular leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo as a candidate on 23 August, canceling the mandatory consultation process (independents currently do not participate, despite their decisive decision-making capacity). Two points stand out in this definition. First, the Royal Assembly considered it necessary to justify the royal proposal by referring to the institutional practice of always nominating the candidate of the party with the largest number of seats (with the exception of the XI Legislative Assembly, 2016); this is a “tradition” (?) in which consultations do not show the existence of a quorum to reject the investment. Second, the proposed candidate has requested and received 35 days from the Presidency of Congress until the start of the debate. Thus, the King wanted to “objectify” his function as much as possible, while adhering to precedents. On the other hand, allowing such a long period of time (at least in theory to garner more support) confirms that the parties either arrived at the King’s consultations without prior deliberation, thus devaluing the royal impetus or trying to speed up the process. Increase negotiation tension as much as possible for better results. In this way, the strengthening of the role of the President of Congress, who sees the right to hold a plenary session as an all-encompassing freedom, which Article 170 of the Statutes of the House never grants him, leaves the Monarchy reduced to a mandate. only bridesmaid. This is not what the Constitution requires the Head of State to be in the election of candidates for the Presidency of the Government.