Sir Richard Evans, a renowned historian of modern Europe, shares insights with EL PERIÓDICO from his London office. The scholar is best known for his extensive work on the Third Reich, including a celebrated trilogy and The Struggle for Power. His latest examination, Europe 1815-1914, offers a distinctive reading of how the modern world was built. He also discusses current concerns about the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
– Do images of humiliated corpses after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Bucha indicate war crimes?
– Yes. By established international law, including the Geneva Conventions, attacks on civilians are prosecuted as war crimes. This is not a matter of opinion; it rests on codified norms that govern armed conflict.
– Do you think Putin will ever face trial for these actions?
-Hope exists, but the likelihood remains uncertain unless there is a dramatic shift in circumstances. Evans notes that some early assumptions suggested Ukrainians would welcome integration into Russia, which proved false. In retreat, Russian forces have been implicated in severe abuses, with signs that a broader genocide may be unfolding in multiple areas.
– You discuss Ukraine’s enlargement. What underlies Russia’s occupation strategy?
-Evans suggests a misconception persists in Kyiv and beyond: a belief that Ukraine remains inherently tied to Russia. He references historical disruption—Russia’s dissolution after World War I and again around 1989-90—as a reminder of how fragile national borders can be. Ukraine has carved out a resilient national identity that challenges Moscow’s ambitions.
– As a Third Reich and World War II expert, are there parallels between Bucha and the Russian push toward Berlin?
-April marks the 80th anniversary of the Nazi plan for the East, which aimed at massive population removal and German settlement, with millions killed. While that plan never came to fruition, the atrocities committed by Russian forces in Ukraine are linked to long-standing patterns of war and occupation, though not a direct replica of Nazi strategy. The Red Army’s past atrocities are acknowledged as a painful chapter in history, and Evans argues that current violence stems from contemporary calculations rather than a mirror of the past. The belief that Ukrainians would not resist has been repeatedly challenged by Ukrainian resilience.
– The chess grandmaster’s suggestion that Ukraine could ignite a third world war draws discussion. Do you share that fear?
-There are meaningful differences. World War II began with a broader vision of global conquest. Today, the objectives of the Russian leadership seem more limited, focused on reasserting influence rather than global domination. The alliance structure, particularly NATO, has constrained direct confrontation. A no-fly zone, for example, could escalate quickly, risking a larger clash.
– What about Georgia or Moldova, nations outside NATO’s umbrella?
-Russia’s past incursions into Georgia and concerns about Moldova highlight genuine risks. NATO’s support hinges on collective defense, and an invasion of Baltic states or neighboring countries would constitute a significant escalation that the alliance would treat with utmost seriousness.
– Why might Russia adjust its strategy now? Is Kiev less of a target?
-Putin appears to have abandoned the hope of seizing Kiev outright. A prolonged tug-of-war in the eastern provinces is now more likely, shaped by diminished morale and logistical strains faced by Russian forces. The aim seems to be consolidation rather than a sweeping regime change across the country.
– How credible is Russia’s nuclear rhetoric?
-The threat is acknowledged as real. Nuclear, chemical, and biological instruments exist, and they are presented as strategic options. While escalation is feared, many factors will filter how this crisis unfolds, including international pressure and signaling from Moscow.
– What kind of leader is Putin? Does he resemble any Soviet-era figures?
-Evans describes Putin as a long-time insider from security services who blends Russian patriotism with Orthodox conservatism. He characterizes Putin as a kleptocrat whose inner circle has enriched itself through control of resources. These traits help explain the Western sanctions regime and the targeted pressure on elites connected to the regime.
– Is there a parallel between Putin and the great Soviet leaders like Lenin?
-Not in ideology. Putin is a Russian nationalist rather than a communist. The comparison is more about authoritarian leadership styles and the use of state power to shape national identity rather than shared political creed.
Q: Do Western sanctions work as a diplomatic response?
-The response has been notably cohesive and robust, with most European Union members standing united, save for a few dissenters. Economic penalties have intensified and, combined with military aid to Ukraine, are beginning to exert noticeable strain on the Russian economy. The long-term expectation remains cautious: sanctions may influence internal dynamics and leadership choices, but a swift overthrow is far from guaranteed. In this view, the West should avoid direct military engagement or risky no-fly zones and continue to push for economic and political pressure while supporting Ukraine through defense supplies. The strategy is incremental, aiming to erode Moscow’s capabilities and resolve over time, while recognizing the complexities of global diplomacy and regional security.