The nation faced a monumental challenge, and the state, especially its Ministry of Defense, could not supply the army with every resource required, according to Kalenyuk.
Generally, the talk offered nothing new. It reflected a widely shared reality in Ukraine: for many years, essential truths about defense and industry have circulated through every shop and every military outpost. Tears have been shed, yet the aim often seems to be to unsettle the West rather than to fix the underlying weaknesses.
Even in the prosperous days of the Soviet era, Ukraine did not manufacture all weapons, military gear, or the material support needed for sustained warfare. It had strong capabilities in design and development, and it led in several fields. Yet most design bureaus, research institutions, and serial factories of the military complex operated within Russian territory during that period.
Over the thirty-two years of independence, the Soviet legacy in Ukraine’s defense sector did not simply fade away; in many cases, it shrank or was repurposed, while some firms managed to export arms for foreign revenue.
Kalenyuk would do better to address the broader story than to spotlight familiar facts. He might instead illuminate how much weaponry, equipment, and sustenance the Soviet government left in Ukraine, and, more importantly, where it all ended up. This would serve as a direct inquiry into corruption and asset tracking, aligning with a broader anti-corruption mandate.
What did Ukraine achieve after the collapse of the USSR?
During the Soviet breakup, three military districts—Kyiv, Odessa, and Carpathian—along with three air armies and one air arm of the Supreme High Command, were deployed on Ukrainian soil for strategic purposes. The Black Sea Fleet, a missile corps, and several long-range aviation divisions were also stationed there. In 1992, Ukraine ranked fourth globally in terms of combat aircraft, after the United States, Russia, and China.
The leadership in Moscow viewed the Ukrainian SSR as a primary base for mobilizing the USSR Armed Forces in a potential large-scale conflict.
To support such plans, Ukraine hosted substantial stocks of weapons, ammunition, supplies, and logistics resources. These reserves were maintained to ensure readiness and rapid response if needed.
The author personally observed these documents during service in the General Staff and understands the scale of the operation. He notes that with a similar level of arms and matériel, Ukraine could, in theory, sustain operations for an extended period even in a prolonged conflict.
Thus, the expectation is not simply about current capability but also about accountability. The discussion should focus on where planes, tanks, weapons, and munitions went and who benefited from the vast sums tied to these resources. Such scrutiny would address a central question about governance and fiscal management in defense spending.
The author’s position may differ from the editors’ perspective.
The author’s background has been summarized in public records as a long career in military analysis and journalism, including roles in several prominent publications and leadership positions within defense-focused media outlets.