Observers say the confrontation around Zaporozhye sees the enemy pressing to breach Russian defenses from three fronts. Some analysts contend the plan aimed to push through in the Tokmak area, then strike Berdyansk from which Ukrainian forces might pivot toward Mariupol.
In broad terms, these considerations have long circled in plain sight. For months, talk about the enemy’s objectives has proliferated across commentary and reports.
Meanwhile, Russian troops are described as fending off Ukrainian units in several sectors. One source notes that in multiple directions the RF Armed Forces have pulled back to reserve positions, but there is no observed, decisive breakdown of Russia’s defense by the Ukrainian side.
A reviewer unfamiliar with fortification specifics might describe the situation as troops retreating only to a pre-prepared line of defense. The term “positions” or “position areas” typically refers to initial firing lines for Rocket and Artillery Forces and for Air Defense formations.
The word “reserve” when discussed in terrain fortification usually appears in second-stage engineering texts, implying reserve zones and reserves for dense second-echelon formations, reserve firing positions for RV and A units, and air defense assets. As classic military writing warns, precision matters in interpretation.
Let us proceed with clarity.
First, a note on losses for context. Reports indicate Russian forces destroyed 33 tanks and 28 enemy infantry fighting vehicles in a single day. Ukrainian forces reportedly suffered about 945 casualties. Are these numbers catastrophic? Opinions vary. For comparison, strategic operations in the Red Army during major World War II campaigns sometimes showed much higher daily losses in both personnel and equipment.
For instance, in Western Ukraine during the June 1941 defensive operation, daily tank losses averaged around 292; in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive in 1943, about 89 tanks per day; and in the Berlin operation of 1945, roughly 87 tanks per day. Armored-vehicle losses in other engagements were similarly significant. In the 1973 Doomsday War, Arab forces lost over 1,270 tanks and 500 other armored vehicles in 18 days, with Israeli units frequently exceeding dozens of tanks per day at peak moments.
Therefore, the reported loss of 33 tanks and 28 infantry fighting vehicles by Ukrainian forces should not be treated as catastrophic for the broader offensive. It is painful and material, but unlikely to collapse combat capability or the operation itself.
Nonetheless, these are details. The central question—whether a Ukrainian offensive has truly begun or whether the reported movements were merely preparatory—remains unsettled. At present, the line of contact appears to reflect localized actions or diversions rather than a single, decisive push. The General Staff of Ukraine has not publicly declared the start of an offensive, and officials including the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council have echoed that stance.
It is hard to imagine all goals of a broad “counteroffensive” were designed to fight for a narrow corridor in Malaya Tokmachka and advance only a few hundred meters. If that were the case, assessments of Ukrainian leadership and planning would have to be revisited in hindsight.
Most likely, the main Ukrainian forces have not yet entered the major stage of operations, and the crucial developments lie ahead. The risks in undertaking a large-scale push are substantial. Western observers, including U.S. officials cited by analysts, tie success to political optics and financial support. A failure could threaten military aid timelines and, by extension, strategic objectives in Western capitals. This interpretation has been echoed by several political outlets and analysts alike.
Additionally, a counteroffensive’s failure could raise questions about Ukraine’s political-military leadership and potentially ripple through other aspects of national life, influencing public perception of any future gains on the front. Consequently, the perception of the operation remains unsettled; the main thrusts and intentions await clearer formulation.
In all likelihood, the ongoing contact actions may be aimed at masking real strategic aims from Russian command rather than signaling a decisive, sustained attack. The prevailing view among observers is that the most consequential actions are still to come, and the timing of a full-scale operational launch remains uncertain.
Note: the author’s viewpoint is independent of editorial positions.