Current strategic variables keep Europe’s military focus on the Red Sea uncertain, with discussion centering on whether United States leadership will endure beyond the middle of the decade. Defense sources suggest that a decisive European commitment is unlikely before the next major milestone in 2024, if not later, reflecting a cautious posture in Brussels and among member states.
Meanwhile, the Bab el Mandeb Strait continues to be a hot zone for shipping disruption. Reports indicate a surge in incidents, including several attacks on merchant vessels, prompting major container lines to rethink routing choices. The elevated cost of insurance and detours has not shifted Spain’s stance, as the defense establishment continues to view a European operation as needing common objectives and a clear mandate, potentially within a mission like EUNAVFOR, aligned with a broader Guardian of Prosperity framework led by the United States.
Official positions from Europe remain stable: no rapid changes are anticipated before the June European elections, according to military sources cited by the regional press network. NATO spokespeople have reiterated that there is no plan for a NATO-led military venture in the Red Sea at this time, underscoring a preference for a coordinated but limited approach among allies.
There has been no formal EU discussion about joint participation in protecting ships against Houthi missiles in the Red Sea. Italy recently dispatched its FREMM-class warship Virginio Fasan to the region, signaling support for a European mission, while stopping short of joining the American coalition. The course correction announced by the Italian government last weekend reflects a shift toward European autonomy in naval security matters.
“No” from Spain
The operation commonly referred to as EUNAVFOR Atalanta has run since 2009, protecting fishing and merchant traffic from Somali pirates and, more recently, supporting ships deployed by humanitarian programs. Spain favors preserving Atalanta’s mandate without bending it to suit evolving naval defense needs in the Red Sea. Spanish officials have explained that any expansion would require a fresh mission with a defined scope, and access would need approval through three gateways: a UN mandate, EU authorization, or a NATO framework.
Spain remains a leading contributor to Atalanta, with a rotating presence that includes a frigate during the monsoon season and two frigates for the remainder of the year, plus an aerial surveillance detachment. The current commander is the Portuguese mission lead, while the Spanish Navy has deployed the F-82 Victoria frigate to patrol the Gulf of Aden, straddling the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Victoria, a Santa María-class cruiser, has decades of operational life ahead, offering strong surveillance and anti-submarine capabilities, though it is not optimized for heavy anti-submarine warfare or self-defense against advanced drone and missile attacks by the Houthis.”
The Victoria has been photographed alongside a cargo vessel in the Horn of Africa, illustrating ongoing naval operations in the region. Spain’s broader naval inventory includes several Álvaro de Bazán-class F-100 frigates, with one typically undergoing maintenance while the remaining units support NATO missions and maritime security duties. This creates a strain on available assets for a larger European Red Sea mission.
Secret information
Contributing units to a U.S.-led mission is not straightforward. A senior Navy official explains that Spain has not entirely stepped back, noting that the Victoria frigate provides tactical intelligence gathered during patrols off the Horn of Africa to cooperating U.S. ships. In the early December period, ahead of debates about including Spain in a broader Guardian of Prosperity coalition, the U.S. Navy asked for a higher level of information sharing, signaling a heating of the operating environment in the region.
Spain’s hesitancy to join the EU’s broader security effort has both political and practical roots. The Middle East contains a fragile balance, and Europe is currently managing a shortfall in anti-missile capabilities at a time when defense-industrial capacity is stressed by the ongoing Ukraine conflict. This has shaped a cautious approach among European partners for at least the immediate future.
Very expensive missiles
A key challenge is the scope of the North American mission, which today is largely limited to escorting cargo heading to the Suez Canal or Israeli ports, and to countering Houthi missiles and drones from warships. The Houthis employ diverse weapons in maritime attacks, including drones and missiles with varying ranges and sources. The broader security picture includes claims of Iranian-made missiles and support networks linked to regional proxies. Accurate tallying of missiles and maintenance resources remains difficult, with occasional public claims about stockpiles and training programs noted by observers.
The Houthis are documented as operating anti-ship missiles and modified weapons, some of which are reportedly backed by allied suppliers. In all cases, these weapons pose a serious threat to large merchant ships in transit through the region. The regional security landscape involves multiple actors and evolving tactics, complicating any single-country response.
There are also reports of other anti-ship capabilities in the region, with various missiles and drone systems attributed to allied and proxy groups. All such developments underscore the need for robust surveillance, rapid decision-making, and credible defensive measures across allied fleets. In this context, the political calculus behind the Guardian of Prosperity framework remains a matter of ongoing debate among alliance members.
Defensive realities
On a practical level, a fully joint, rapid-response defense against these attacks would require locating the launch points and destroying them with precision strikes or defensive fire. But a definitive, joined-up approach has not yet crystallized, and neither the United States nor Iran appears eager to escalate into a broader regional conflict. The outcome is a constrained strategy aimed at preventing further ship bombings while avoiding a larger confrontation that could destabilize the broader Middle East.
For the time being, Western navies rely on a mix of existing defenses. The Aegis-equipped fleets, featuring modern anti-missile systems, are a cornerstone of naval protection for high-value assets. In practice, these systems rely on vertical launch cells and modern interceptor missiles, with individual missiles costing significant sums. The newest frigates carry ESSM missiles as a backbone of their self-defense and fleet defense capability. Each unit represents a substantial budget item within defense portfolios.
Complementing missile defense, the Vulcan Phalanx rotary cannon provides a last line of defense against incoming drones. While it can deliver rapid-fire coverage, it addresses only a subset of threats. An expert naval adviser notes that a realistic, cost-effective approach prioritizes disrupting the drone and missile launchers at the source, rather than pursuing broad, long-range strikes that would escalate costs and risk unintended consequences.
In this evolving scene, the question remains: how much of Europe’s naval strength should be committed to a Red Sea security mission, and under what legal and political framework? The answer hinges on alliance cohesion, risk tolerance, and the ability to align resources with a clearly defined mission scope that protects shipping lanes without triggering a wider regional crisis.