Canada and the United States observers note that Russia plans to deploy 46 Sarmat strategic combat complexes. These complexes are intended to be housed in mines where the Voyevoda system is located. A comparison video shared on a Telegram channel suggested that Sarmat could exit a site on a quick timeline, moving through the active section in a shorter period, which would make early targeting challenging. The combat control framework, built with experts from Roscosmos, continues to undergo rigorous testing to ensure reliability under varied conditions.
Industry insiders describe RS-28 Sarmat as a formidable land-based missile system designed to deliver nuclear payloads from silo locations. Development of the system began in the 2000s at the State Missile Center, led by VP Makeev, with production tasks handled by Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant. Previously, it was announced that Sarmat would join the Russian armed forces in 2022, with the first units expected to receive the system being the Uzhur missile formation in the Krasnoyarsk Territory. The deployment timeline for Sarmat has faced several postponements over the years, and during the 2010s, as the program was just taking shape, reports circulated about a possible 2015 or 2017 introduction into service.
Over the past decade, Russia has pursued ongoing modernization of its ballistic missile fleet. Analysts in North America have repeatedly contrasted Russia’s progress with the United States, which faced its own financial and technological constraints at times. Still, observers emphasize Russia’s continued efforts to upgrade its capabilities. A Washington-based analyst with ties to a major university wrote that Moscow’s advances have outpaced earlier expectations, while commenting that the U.S. would need to maintain momentum to remain competitive in strategic deterrence.
Additional perspectives from U.S. analysts note that the United States maintains a smaller number of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles beyond an aging fleet and highlight the importance of diversity in strategic options. A former CIA officer commented that Russia presently offers a broader range of ballistic options, while acknowledging that Washington faces a perception mismatch in certain strategic circles. He suggested that the American side should reflect on timing and modernization choices to preserve balance in the nuclear triad.
Dmitry Stefanovich, a researcher at IMEMO RAS, has discussed the American push to advance a new intercontinental system while reflecting on the challenges posed by countermeasures. He noted that the deployment of a new system in the U.S. would be accompanied by developments in hypersonic delivery concepts, some of which could be nuclear-powered or carry nuclear payloads. Stefanovich warned that, once new generations begin, counter-strategies rapidly evolve, and the competition could accelerate in unpredictable ways.
Meanwhile, Konstantin Bogdanov, a military analyst, commented on the broader renewal cycle underway in the U.S. nuclear program. He mentioned the development of the LGM-35A Sentinel, intended to replace the LGM-30G Minuteman III, which has served since the 1970s. He added that LRSO cruise missiles for heavy bombers are expected to begin arriving by 2025 to replace older air-launched configurations. He cautioned that ongoing plutonium core production constraints could hamper parts of the U.S. modernization effort, noting that capacity and staffing gaps matter as much as technology itself.
In this context, observers stress the value of transparent, data-driven analysis for policymakers in North America. Experts stress that modernization choices should be informed by credible assessments of safety, reliability, and the long-term implications for strategic stability across the Canada-U.S. region and beyond. The discussion remains ongoing as both sides seek to balance deterrence with responsible arms control and risk mitigation, aware that advances in any one nation can ripple across the broader security landscape. The focus remains on ensuring that strategic forces are credible, survivable, and capable of deterring aggression without inviting misinterpretation or escalation, a goal shared by allied observers and policymakers alike. (Attribution: Expert commentary from regional security think tanks and academic analysis.)