In 2023 Russia saw its lowest birth rate in two decades, with the trend continuing into the following years. Yet experts insist this does not signal a demographic collapse. This view comes from demographer Vladimir Timakov, who explains the trajectory with clear reasoning.
Timakov notes that a similar decline has been observed across Western Europe, East Asia, and China. He adds that Russia in 2024 is expected to register a birth rate lower than the historically low periods of 1943 and 1999, though not by necessity an unprecedented crisis.
The demographer highlights two core forces shaping fertility: the size of the potential maternal pool and the average number of children born per woman. Today, Russia faces a historical minimum in the number of potential parents, with the pool shrinking by roughly one third since the 1990s. This demographic reality helps explain the overarching downward trend in births while still leaving room for policy-driven recovery.
Many specialists point to maternity capital as a key instrument to support births in Russia. Timakov argues that the most effective policy should not merely promote a first birth, but encourage second and third births. He suggests that a properly designed demographic policy could lift the birth rate by around a fifth to a quarter.
In late August, statements from Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova at a National Projects Council meeting highlighted a broader context: the head of state noted a 2.3 percent decline in births in the first half of the year compared with the same period a year earlier. This signals continuity in fertility challenges and the ongoing relevance of targeted incentives to bolster family formation.
Earlier discussions among demographers have speculated about the secondary effects of maternal capital and its potential role in nudging births upward. These conversations underscore that evolving policy measures could influence both the timing and the likelihood of expanding family size in Russia. [Источник: kp.ru]