The political crisis in Bolivia has breathed briefly after authorities and a diverse opposition described a “coup d’etat” as the government faced arrests of the former Army commander, General Juan José Zúñiga, and Vice Admiral Juan Arnez Salvador. The ambiguous nature of the uprising is now prompting a deeper analysis, reminding observers of the strong tensions that preceded the moment when armored vehicles rolled into the streets.
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A History of Instability
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The executive seat has long carried the nickname Palacio Quemado, dating to a 1875 clash in which opposition forces hurled torches at the building during Tomás Fríass presidency. The descriptor of a building scarred by fire, as Martín Sivak notes in a biography about Evo Morales, seems to reference a country prone to upheaval since its founding in 1825. The record shows that of 83 governments, 36 did not last more than a year, 37 were de facto, and no historian has pinned down an exact count of coups and attempted putschs. Some place the number as high as 190.
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By the early 1980s, the era of frequent coups by uniformed forces appeared to wind down, some marked by tragedy. Yet Morales’s 2019 resignation and removal rekindled military involvement, with police complicity. In the wake of those events, the term “coup” reentered everyday political discourse.
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Unlike four years and a half ago, Zúñiga reportedly acted alone this time. President Luis Arce moved quickly to refresh the military leadership. The new commanders pledged loyalty, sealing the defeat of a venture that, in the words of its leader, failed due to logistical problems and a delayed entry of units into action.
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Rejection of a Purely Political Narrative
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Several factors set this week’s events apart from the 2019 power transition. The episode lacked broad political and social backing: the streets did not fill with crowds chanting for the general in revolt, nor did the opposition rally around the uprising. In November 2019, a significant faction of opposition parties supported destabilizing moves and urged people to mobilize. Santa Cruz regional leader Fernando Camacho stood out, while Senator Jeanine Áñez swiftly took an oath with a Bible in hand at a palace left vacant after Morales’s departure. Both are currently detained for their roles in that ruse. The center-right and right-wing factions reacted similarly to the latest events.
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OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, then based in Uruguay, had in 2019 sparked the discord by challenging the controversial elections that Morales had won. The conspirators felt a rush of legitimacy that Zúñiga did not share. The consensus on defending democracy among the parties quickly eroded. Former president Carlos Mesa, who left power in 2004 amid protests led by Morales, called the scene on the balcony of Palacio Quemado a “farce” performed for political purposes, as Arce appeared there about 14 months before upcoming elections.
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The Zúñiga Case
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The paper El Deber from Santa Cruz nicknamed him “the general closest to the president,” a label that fed speculation about the coup. Appointed by Arce in November 2022, Zúñiga’s public hostility toward Morales, who accused him of pursuing influence, resurfaced last week when the general claimed Morales should not be able to “return to the presidency.”
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That confrontation—coming from a specialist in military intelligence—had consequences. Zúñiga was dismissed the same night. The next day he headed toward the Palacio Quemado, and the uprising collapsed almost as quickly as it had begun. Before surrendering, his sponsor claimed he had not acted on his own. “The president told me the situation was bad and needed something to boost his popularity.” The images of Zúñiga and Arce arguing at the executive gate did not align with the general’s story, unless it was a carefully staged pantomime. Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo rejected Zúñiga, calling him unhinged.
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Economic Strains
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Arce helped drive what was once called the “Bolivian miracle” during Morales’s tenure as Economy Minister (2006-2019). Steady GDP growth was supported by gas revenues and nationalizations, inflation fell, unrest subsided, and poverty dropped. The economy cooled in 2014 due to a slump in global commodity prices.
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Today’s government faces shortages and reserve erosion at the central bank. Out of roughly 15 billion dollars in reserves, only about 2 billion remain. The dollar shortage hit the domestic market in several ways. The president acknowledged trouble ensuring gasoline and diesel supplies. A decade ago, local production could meet domestic demand.
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Currently, imports accounted for about 86% of these fuels because of low investments and exhausted fields. With no dollars, fuel supplies suffered. Heavy transport operators launched protests seeking solutions. Prices for several staple foods rose as goods were bought from neighboring countries. Authorities argued that hidden, personal political interests drove these conditions, a quiet critique of Morales. Morales argued that Bolivia stood “worse than during neoliberal times.”
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A Debilitating Clash
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The failed uprising cannot be separated from the brutal clash between Arce and Morales that has fractured the Movement for Socialism (MAS). In 2020, Morales invited himself from exile in Mexico to run again. Arce won decisively, but that victory opened a path to leadership not welcomed by Morales, who hoped to return to power in 2026. The rift widened from subtle disagreements to open clashes, with Morales signaling a possible surge in protests if his ambitions were thwarted.
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Justice in Bolivia has long aligned with those in power, and it stepped in again. Last year the Constitutional Court ruled that unlimited reelection is not a human right and rejected Arce’s singular candidacy, while legitimizing a MAS congress dominated by Arce supporters. Morales maintains that his faction is the rightful MAS leadership and has repeatedly called for road blockades. In the days leading up to Zúñiga’s uprising, internal MAS tensions again dominated the political stage. The arcist faction chose not to attend a party summit with rivals. A key critic, Mario Seña, accused Morales of deceiving the Bolivian public about unity. Vice President David Choquehuanca, once Morales’s foreign minister, labeled him a two-faced traitor for resigning in 2019, calling him a “mythmaker.” Under these conditions, opposition groups see a favorable climate to win the next election, which explains why they distanced themselves from Zúñiga’s attempt.
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