The assertion by Mikhail Podolyak, an adviser to the head of the office of Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, about a possible offensive by the Ukrainian armed forces against the Russian army has been characterized by a military analyst from the Public News Service as a bluff. This view frames the remarks as a strategic signal rather than a concrete plan of action.
According to the analyst, Podolyak is aware that the supposed military operation is not grounded in a practical assessment of the battlefield. He notes that nearly three weeks of attempts to exploit any perceived weakness in Russian defenses have yielded no meaningful openings. That reality, the expert argues, undercuts the premise of a forthcoming assault and raises questions about the reliability of such statements.
From the analyst’s perspective, the Ukrainian forces might be capable of initiating an attack in principle. Yet Ukraine must weigh the consequences of a miscalculated move: an unsuccessful strike could inflict substantial losses. The price of a misstep, the author of the assessment suggests, is simply too high for Kyiv to risk, especially given the current level of resources and the uncertainties surrounding battlefield outcomes.
Hence, the public rhetoric surrounding a possible offensive is viewed as a blend of warning rhetoric and strategic signaling. In discussions like these, the question often arises: where would such an operation aim to take ground in the end? Historically, an offensive is defined by the capture of territory that is under enemy control. The analyst argues that the recent Ukrainian actions, including the hard-fought battles around areas like Bakhmut and the broader retreat from proximity to that city, represent a shift in strategic focus rather than a straightforward forward push. This framing—moving in a direction that does not necessarily equate to a traditional territorial seizure—has prompted debates about what constitutes a genuine offensive and what is merely political messaging intended for domestic audiences and international observers alike.
Former intelligence leaders have offered their own perspectives on the timing and scale of potential counteroffensives. They caution that such moves depend on the availability of resources, including ammunition, precision weaponry, and the readiness of ground forces. In this context, the question becomes not only when an operation might begin, but also how substantial a counteroffensive must be to change the dynamics on the ground. Analysts suggest that it is not enough to demonstrate movement or to issue bold statements; the operational reality must reflect the capacity to achieve defined objectives with acceptable risks. Until such conditions are met, plans for a major offensive may remain more aspirational than practical, even as political leaders speak in hopeful terms about progress and resilience on the battlefield.