It was a farewell that sparked rivers of ink and a flurry of clever memes. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, closed his North Korea visit last June on the tarmac at Pyongyang’s airport with exuberant goodbyes, frenetic handshakes, and a string of bows directed through the aircraft window toward his counterpart Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong, the sister famed for her hardline reputation. It wasn’t the only moment of apparent camaraderie between the two leaders during the trip: hours earlier they had departed in a friendly mood, smiling broadly and exchanging congratulations while both sat behind the wheel of an Auxus, a high-end Russian-made car valued at about 380,000 euros, a gift from Putin to Kim Jong-un. The era of Cold War habits, when the USSR led the so-called “peoples’ democracies” and looked down on allies like North Korea, now seemed a thing of the past.
Four months later, the fruits of that camaraderie are appearing on the fronts of the war in Ukraine. Roughly 13,000 North Korean soldiers, according to South Korea’s intelligence services, have been sent to Russia to take part in Moscow’s war against its western neighbor, which began in February 2022. Observers say these troops have been deployed to the Kursk region, a move that, since it remains within Russian territory, would be justified under international law; other reports, however, suggest a small number could already be inside Ukrainian territory, according to two intelligence sources cited by CNN. The Associated Press has reported that about 8,000 North Koreans were moving within Russia toward the internationally recognized border with Ukraine. Beyond the uncertainty, one thing appears clear: the North Korean contingent has already suffered its first casualties in combat.
Nothing in Russia happens by accident, and the Kremlin treats this kind of external outsourcing of war as a way to offset the heavy losses recorded in the latest eastern offensives. Mijailo Samus, a former Ukrainian serviceman who leads the New Geopolitics Research Network, a Kyiv-based platform focusing on geopolitics, explains this perspective. Newsweek cites Ukrainian military officials who say Russia could have lost as many as 10,000 troops in a single week, a figure that might climb to 40,000 by October.
Putin aims to conquer as much territory as possible before the United States elects a new president, the analyst notes. Facing the domestic risks of mobilization, he appears to prefer drawing troops from the Asian ally, which fields a large army of about 600,000. The expert’s view is that the North Korean contingent would act as light infantry, undertaking ground incursions after artillery bombardments or guided bombs, allowing the Pyongyang-based army to gain capabilities ahead of any confrontation with South Korea, Samus concludes.
To spur defections and carry out propaganda among the arriving soldiers, South Korean officials are already in Kyiv advising their Ukrainian counterparts. The main objective in Ukraine and in Western capitals remains to stop or at least hinder this human flow from growing, given North Korea’s high level of militarization and its enormous armed forces, and to prevent a shift in the balance of the war in favor of Moscow.
Every pact has costs, and Kim Jong-un shows no interest in joining a distant-front war without concessions from Moscow. In this case, the sought-after concessions come in the form of technology transfers that could boost North Korea’s own military capacity, a development that alarms Europe, the United States, and allied Asian capitals. Samus notes progress in areas like submarines and ballistic missiles. The Russia-North Korea alliance, as anticipated, raises serious concern in Western capitals. American leaders are already engaging China in discussions on this topic; despite its proximity to both Moscow and Pyongyang, Beijing has not shown enthusiasm for a move that many fear could become the most significant escalation since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.