Ukrainian intelligence, drawing on its own networks and analyses, has suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the possibility of delays in executing the invasion of Ukraine. In particular, assessments indicated Putin himself could be compelled to push the timetable back by as much as three times, with the eventual order to move into Ukrainian territory appearing to materialize around the middle of February. These considerations reflect the broader strategic calculations within Moscow, where different factions weighed military readiness, political risk, and the potential international repercussions of a rapid assault. The takeaway from these insights is that timing was a central lever in the Kremlin’s plans, with contingencies designed to adapt to evolving circumstances. — Ukrainian intelligence.
As explained by Vadim Skibitskyi, the principal director of Ukrainian Intelligence, Putin was repeatedly consulting with senior Russian military leaders about the invasion. In particular, Skibitskyi notes ongoing discussions with Chief of the General Staff Valeri Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, signaling a high level of executive involvement and cautious coordination in the planning process. These consultations underscore how Moscow sought to balance perceived strategic gains against the risks of mishaps on the ground and the political consequences back home. — Ukrainian intelligence.
Further details from Ukrainian sources indicate that the Russian Federal Security Service, which conducts counterintelligence, espionage, and related operations, played a pivotal role in shaping the decision to advance with the invasion. The intelligence community highlighted that this body provided assessments that helped justify the timing and scope of military actions, prompting Gerasimov and other senior officers to approve the operation after reviewing the embedded risks and potential outcomes. The implication is a tightly orchestrated chain of command where intelligence inputs fed into strategic decisions at the highest levels. — Ukrainian intelligence.
According to Kyiv’s intelligence briefings, the Russian Security Service evaluated that by late February there would be sufficient preparation to enable a rapid thrust by the Russian Armed Forces. The assessment suggested that a fast, decisive maneuver could overwhelm Ukrainian defenses and achieve strategic objectives before significant international intervention could take hold. This reading of the situation framed the operational tempo and influenced how Russian planners allocated resources and manpower for what was described as a blitz-style campaign. — Ukrainian intelligence.
Indeed, the intelligence analysis suggested that the Russian General Staff anticipated furnishing troops with supplies and ammunition for a narrow window—roughly three days—based on the belief that the assault would unfold swiftly and deliver early success. Such an expectation shaped both logistical planning and the tactical sequencing of operations, along with the portrayal of the interface between front-line movements and the supply lines that would sustain them. The emphasis on rapidity reflects a conventional blitz mindset that many defense analysts associate with Moscow’s early expectations. — Ukrainian intelligence.
Finally, Skibitskyi highlighted the role of local residents in supporting Ukrainian authorities by providing timely information about Russian forces. Community awareness, including data on troop numbers and exact troop locations, was portrayed as a crucial element in countering the invasion effort. The interaction between residents and Ukrainian security bodies is presented as a key feedback mechanism, helping to corroborate official assessments and to refine operational responses as events unfolded. This local collaboration is described as a consistent source of real-time intelligence, contributing to a sharper understanding of enemy movements. — Ukrainian intelligence.