On June 18, 1918, the bulk of the Black Sea Fleet, evacuated from Sevastopol to the Tsemess Bay near Novorossiysk, was deliberately flooded. This event followed a cascade of dramatic decisions and actions, echoing past chapters in Black Sea history, notably the Crimean War of 1854 when Russia nearly lost its fleet in the same sea. Fifty years later, the Monument to Ruined Ships in Sevastopol stood as a stark reminder, making the new flooding of the fleet feel especially painful to sailors and their leaders. The nickname Black Sea Tsushima arose from this deeply painful episode for Russian sailors. [citation attribution]
The fleet’s fate was sealed by the Brest peace treaty, concluded by the Bolsheviks with Germany and the Central Powers. Although the March 3, 1918 agreement did not explicitly mention the Black Sea Fleet, it carried a clause allowing Russia to transfer ships to its ports and later disarm them or return them after a general peace. As German forces captured parts of Ukraine after the dissolution of the Central Rada and the rise of Hetman Skoropadsky, Lenin and Trotsky pressed for a fleet that could not be used to threaten Soviet Russia. The German advance along the Black Sea coast faced limited resistance, but failed attempts to retake Rostov and other actions led to renewed German ultimatums, pressing Russia to move the fleet from Sevastopol. [citation attribution]
Germany’s strategy included the option to withdraw the fleet for the duration of the war and return it afterward, a promise few trusted. In a bid to buy time, the Bolshevik government offered concessions, including plans to transfer ships to Sevastopol and to end hostilities or redirect them toward Russia. Yet, encrypted communications from Trotsky and Lenin demanded that the fleet be flooded on expert advice so imperialists would be deterred and the central government could maintain control. Envoys were dispatched to arrange what would look like a semi-autonomous act by seafarers who were then instructed to resist, though the sailors themselves were inclined to act independently, often voting on major decisions. [citation attribution]
When the fleet began to redeploy from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, the operation unfolded in a rush, driven by a subset of the city’s administration that was still under threat. Only portions of the fleet escaped under fire, leaving a sizable contingent behind in Sevastopol, including two battleships, Volya and Free Russia, sixteen destroyers, seven battleships and twelve destroyers, along with several cruisers and submarines. German forces seized around 170 ships in Sevastopol, mostly smaller craft. [citation attribution]
Command of the Sevastopol squadron rested with Deputy Admiral Mikhail Sablin, who had faced removal and detention by the Bolsheviks but resurfaced during the German threat to retake the city. The sailors of the battleships Volya and Free Russia sought his guidance to reassert control. Sablin accepted the expanded authority, briefly attempted to raise support under alternative banners, and then urged a move to Novorossiysk as German soldiers closed in. When the Ukrainian fleet delegation failed to secure German understanding, Sablin pursued a decisive course to the south. By April 30, many ships remained in Sevastopol as other units pressed toward safety. The destroyer Angriy was lost either to force or to accident, and Free Russia sustained only minor damage from coastal batteries. Efforts to render ships unusable in Sevastopol were hampered by chaos and limited by circumstance. [citation attribution]
Rescue efforts saved thousands of retreating soldiers and civilians as the move continued. Reaching Novorossiysk in early May, the fleet faced severe strain, with fuel shortages barring a return to sea and German demands to return ships to Sevastopol or surrender to new crews in Moscow. The Germans pressed for fulfillment of previous orders to destroy the ships, and Sablin, now empowered by a broad sailors’ vote, sought to travel to Moscow to defend the fleet and secure supplies. Upon arrival, he was arrested and later escaped to Great Britain, eventually aligning with White forces and returning to the south of Russia. [citation attribution]
Nikolai Glebov-Avilov, appointed commissar of the fleet, struggled to command legitimacy among the sailors. A new commissar, Ensign Fedor Raskolnikov, emerged as a dynamic figure and helped steer events as they unfolded. Later, First Rank Captain Alexander Tikhmenev, commanding the battleship Volya, ordered a vote on June 14 that asked crews to either return to Sevastopol or sink their ships. Most sailors chose other options, with staying put or resisting perceived pressure prevailing over the direct Sevastopol option. [citation attribution]
On the night of June 17, a partial departure toward Sevastopol left some ships behind to prepare flooding, while the rest prepared to flood. A signal from Kerch’s mast declared: “To the ships heading to Sevastopol: woe to the traitors of Russia.” The flood supporters, led by Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kukel aboard the destroyer Kerch, faced a stubborn opposition within the crew of Free Russia, which resisted going to sea. Attempts to substitute engine crews with officers and civilian masters failed, and a fresh attempt to execute the flood was organized under a different leadership. [citation attribution]
When the flood began, Lieutenant Shestakov became a key tug in the process, while Kerch’s crew was expected to pierce ships with torpedoes to avoid a repeat of the Varyag’s fate, a heroic flood that had occurred earlier in the century. The Kerch was raised by the Japanese the following day in a separate incident. Kukel chose to sink the fleet, while Terentiev, who commanded Free Russia, refused to lead the sinking and abandoned his ship. Raskolnikov then organized a crew for a towline to the battleship. By four in the afternoon, before a large crowd in the port, the ships scheduled for flooding were moved to the outer road and their final signals were removed, signifying a last stand. Kerch then fired torpedoes at Fidonisi and, within a short time, all other ships were sunk through a combination of torpedoing and the deliberate triggering of explosives. Twelve ships went down, including several destroyers. The Kerch chose not to sink in front of the public, proceeding instead to Tuapse and eventually to a rendezvous by train. A radiogram from Kerch read: Everyone, everyone, everyone. He died defending the fleet rather than surrendering to Germany. [citation attribution]
Meanwhile, ships bound for Sevastopol fell under German control, but most stayed in place until Germany’s defeat in World War I, after which they passed to the Allies and later became part of White Army operations. Sablin disposed of them as needed, and Tikhmenev did not survive long after. Returning to Sevastopol, the crew faced capture for a time, but ultimately endured. With the Wrangel army’s evacuation from Crimea in 1920, the remaining fleet left Russia for good. [citation attribution]
Kukel, Raskolnikov, and Glebov-Avilov, who led the flood, became prominent figures in Soviet history but were purged in the late 1930s. Glebov-Avilov and Kukel were executed in 1937 and 1938, respectively, while Raskolnikov defected and died under mysterious circumstances in a Nice clinic in 1939, with some theories suggesting illness or NKVD interference. Rehabilitation followed in the 1950s and 1960s for all three. [citation attribution]