Night flight Moscow-Hong Kong
A wide-body Airbus A310-308 left Sheremetyevo International Airport at 20:39 on 22 March 1994. Flight SU593 from Moscow to Hong Kong carried 12 crew members and 63 passengers, a majority of whom were Russian citizens. The aircraft advanced smoothly to cruising altitude, approximately 10,100 meters, and the crew reported no initial issues as the flight continued through the early evening hours.
At 00:56 on 23 March, four hours after takeoff, the airplane began a rapid descent and quickly disappeared from radar. Wreckage was found near Mezhdurechensk in the Kemerovo region, and search and rescue operations began immediately. Early assessments pointed to a catastrophic failure with questions about how such an event could occur given the absence of known threats or any alarming alerts in the flight plan. Initial hypotheses explored weather effects and potential impacts with atmospheric objects, but none offered a conclusive explanation at that stage.
In the weeks that followed, the recovery of flight recorders and expert analyses revealed the underlying cause of the disaster. The investigation identified a sequence of human factors and cockpit management decisions that led to a loss of control and the aircraft breaking apart. It became clear that the tragedy was not solely the result of an external attack or a technical defect, but the culmination of multiple risky actions within the cockpit escalating rapidly.
History of a plane crash
The flight appeared to proceed smoothly until late in the evening. The aircraft was commanded by a standby captain, Yaroslav Kudrinsky, age 39, who had accumulated substantial flight experience with more than 8,900 hours, including 907 hours on the Airbus A310. The captain in command was 40-year-old Andrei Danilov, with 9,675 total hours and 950 hours on the A310, who was resting in the cabin at the time. The first officer in the cockpit was 33-year-old Igor Piskarev, with 5,885 flight hours, including 440 hours on the A310.
Just before 00:40, as the flight neared its destination, signs of lax cockpit discipline emerged when a child appeared in the crew area. Yana Kudrinsky, then 13, and later Eldar Kudrinsky, aged 15, became part of the cockpit flow. The assigned relief pilot briefly vacated the immediate flight deck area but did not transfer control to the co-pilot, effectively relying on the autopilot for longer than is typical. This shift marked a dangerous deviation from standard operating procedures, since flight control should remain with qualified crew while the autopilot assists rather than replaces human oversight.
With the child in the cockpit, the crew watched as the youngster attempted to operate the controls with guidance from Kudrinsky. The autopilot continued to follow the programmed route while the young passenger made rudder and heading adjustments. The situation intensified as the youngster maneuvered the aircraft briefly, and the autopilot responded accordingly, creating a mismatch between the commanded flight path and the aircraft’s actual attitude. The co-pilot and other crew members attempted to regain control, but the combination of limited training and rapidly changing conditions led to instability in the cockpit.
The crew faced growing challenges as the young passenger engaged more with the flight instruments. Kudrinsky tried to guide the child while the autopilot kept automatic control, producing a volatile interaction that curtailed the crew’s ability to manage the aircraft’s attitude and airspeed. This conflict manifested as unusual bank angles and deviations from the assigned altitude, with neither the autopilot nor the flight crew sharing a clear, mutually understood plan for stabilizing the plane.
As the situation worsened, the autopilot disengaged or reacted incorrectly to evolving cockpit demands. The crew confronted a widening gap between the aircraft’s actual behavior and the expected behavior the automation was designed to sustain. The result was a growing loss of situational awareness and delayed corrective actions by the pilots.
Despite efforts to recover, the airplane descended rapidly. Social and organizational dynamics in the cockpit—distractions from in-cabin activities and delayed decisive control actions—contributed to the erosion of safety during the critical moments of the incident. The aircraft ultimately touched down in terrain incapable of supporting a safe recovery, resulting in a fatal outcome for everyone on board.
In the aftermath, investigators documented the sequence of events and examined the duties of all crew members. The final assessment stressed strict adherence to flight-deck discipline, a clear transfer of control, and vigilant monitoring of automation by qualified pilots. The incident underscored the risks of allowing non-crewmembers to influence cockpit operations and reinforced the need for robust cockpit resource management and careful autopilot handling procedures. A notable addition to the A310 operating manual clarified the limits on autopilot engagement when unexpected inputs occur and reinforced safe handling practices in all circumstances.
No survivors were reported from the crash site, and the investigation highlighted lessons for pilot training, cockpit management, and safety protocols in automated flight operations. The emphasis was on preventing similar losses through disciplined crew coordination and careful monitoring of automated systems across all phases of flight.
Was the plane destroyed by a child?
Official investigations attributed the accident to a combination of crew actions that allowed unauthorized control of the aircraft. While this framing is common in formal reports, experts note that cockpit incidents are rarely caused by a single factor. Investigators widely recognized a lapse in judgment and supervision that permitted a non-pilot to influence the flight path in a way the autopilot could not safely compensate for. The record invites more than a question about whether a child can sit in the captain’s seat under automated control; it centers on what the supervising captain did while the situation unfolded.
The commission noted that the person in the right seat did not actively monitor the instruments or intervene effectively as the situation deteriorated. Instead, attention was diverted by other activities, including capturing video, which compounded the delay in recognizing the severity of the problem. In response to the tragedy, aviation authorities issued cautions about immediate instrument monitoring and decisive manual control when automation is involved and unexpected inputs occur. The practical lesson led to tighter autopilot limits and a mandate for pilots to disengage automation promptly when control inputs become unsafe.
In Canada and the United States as well as elsewhere, the takeaways center on disciplined crew coordination, prompt instrument monitoring, and proactive manual control when automation shows signs of unsafe inputs. The event remains a benchmark reminder that automation assists, but it does not replace seasoned judgment and clear, timely action in the cockpit. [Citation: Official investigation reports and aviation safety analyses]