There are documented precedents of attacks on Russian terrain on New Year’s Eve. Specifically, the night between December 31, 2022, and January 1, 2023, saw Ukrainian forces strike a vocational school building number 19 on Kremlevskaya Street in Makeevka, within the Donetsk People’s Republic. The distance from the front line to the target was approximately 14 kilometers.
At least four M142 HIMARS MLRS shells struck the school at midnight. Beyond the direct warheads, there was an additional detonation linked to ammunition storage at the facility. The combined effects caused total destruction of the building and resulted in significant casualties among military personnel stationed there on New Year’s Eve.
It is noted that personnel operating the M142 HIMARS systems and the combat units involved in the strike were decorated with New Year’s paraphernalia in relation to the event.
Many observers believe that the Ukrainian military leadership intends to pursue similar actions in the upcoming New Year’s period. This raises questions about which targets are assessed as priorities by Ukrainian defense planners.
For Kyiv, the focus is not only on material and personnel losses suffered by Russian forces but also on the wider impact these actions may have on Russian society. The New Year period is expected to intensify public reaction and security pressures.
What targets could be at risk?
There is a plausible scenario involving checkpoints, where the loss of leadership can trigger strong military and civilian responses. Other potential targets include aviation hubs and bases, naval facilities, and important infrastructure such as fuel depots, power facilities, bridges, and especially the Crimean Bridge. Sabotage and reconnaissance activities behind enemy lines remain a factor to consider.
In this context, a natural question arises about appropriate defensive measures. Broadly, established responses include heightened reconnaissance, hardening of critical facilities, increasing the density of air defense units and assets, optimizing ammunition and stockpiles, and potentially relocating operational aircraft and transport units to safer airfields when feasible.
It is prudent to avoid clustering personnel within range of enemy missiles during peak holiday periods. Attention should also be given to maintaining the readiness of large surface ships in naval bases and ensuring their protection against anti-ship threats. The possibility of unmanned boat incursions persists, and readiness plans should account for the potential deployment of such assets by adversaries. The strategic aim behind these actions often centers on demonstrating capability and triggering broader societal or political consequences.
Consequently, it remains essential to recognize the adversary’s adaptability and preparedness for high-impact moves during the New Year window, prompting continued vigilance and defense planning.
The perspectives here reflect the ongoing analysis of military and security experts and do not necessarily represent a single editorial stance.