War strategy resembles a chess game where the pieces are fallen soldiers. The person fighting on Ukrainian soil shows no sign that the next move will be a peace negotiation. Yet every war ends through some form of agreement or halt: a negotiated settlement, a ceasefire with terms, or a lasting freeze. Strategists in Kyiv and Moscow, Brussels and Washington watch every possible move, including subtle steps that could reshape the outcome. Ukraine aims to regain control of all territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea, Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhia; Russia wants regime stability and lasting control over the areas it has won. The most likely scenario lies somewhere between these extremes and will demand dialogue, but who mediates and under what conditions? Might a UN peacekeeping presence line a ceasefire zone in Donbas? Could there be a legally sound referendum in Crimea this time around?
Peace processes expert and professor of Defense Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, Walter Dorn, envisions a peace process led by United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who has faced challenges with the grain export agreement. Regarding blue helmets, he notes that both sides earlier showed willingness to accept UN peacekeepers after 2014, but agreement on their exact deployment areas remained elusive. Ukraine, alongside observers from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, requested UN personnel at the border with Russia and in the contact zone between the two sides.
“They would operate under the secretary-general’s command and include personnel from various nations, including Europe, the United States, and even non-aligned states such as those from Africa or parts of Asia,” Dorn explains. “The difficulty is that a party winning on the battlefield tends to resist negotiation. Negotiations rarely begin in earnest until war fatigue sets in.”
In peace process terminology, this is a painful stalemate—a stillness that tests everyone. Timothy Donais, a conflict resolution expert and professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, notes that neither side expects decisive victory or avoids heavy losses. Since the summer, Ukraine has taken the initiative and laid groundwork for offensive action, reducing its incentive to negotiate and seeking to push Russia out of all territory, including Crimea.
“If the balance changes and the war slides into a painful stalemate, it becomes more plausible to imagine conditions for a negotiated solution,” Donais observes. “Peace processes almost always involve agreements between sworn enemies, and while distasteful, a final settlement could emerge even if it means conceding some territorial realities to stop further bloodshed.”
Donais sees blue helmet deployment as unlikely unless both sides are severely pressured and bleeding. United Nations peacekeeping missions require the consent of the parties involved. “Soldiers would have to position themselves between the two sides, effectively creating a ground demarcation and setting the stage for a final settlement,” he notes. At present, it is hard to imagine a UN mission gaining broad acceptance for a formal demarcation line.
“Given the current moment, the probability of a peaceful path looks very low,” says Brian Orend, Director of International Studies and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo in Canada.
Negotiation, ceasefire, peace agreement
Dorn describes the typical sequence that ends a conflict: negotiations begin or continue intermittently, followed by a ceasefire while talks persist. A truism often emerges—a temporary breach may occur, but warfare does not resume at full scale. Ultimately, a peace treaty follows. “The final agreement would likely include: (1) Russia’s withdrawal to borders as they stood on February 23, or recognition of Russian control over previously acquired territories; (2) Ukraine accepting the presence of Russian bases in Crimea and applying the essential provisions of the Minsk framework, including a ceasefire, troop and heavy weapon withdrawal, and local elections.”
After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, a Minsk agreement was reached in Minsk, the capital of Belarus. The ceasefire faltered and was renegotiated among Russia, Ukraine, and the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk to strengthen pressure, with the OSCE taking a leading mediating role before its mandate shifted and funding priorities changed.
Crimea’s status
The Crimean peninsula remains the most sensitive issue. Vladimir Putin framed the annexation as a historic achievement in 2014 after a controversial referendum, while Kyiv insists that no lasting peace is possible without the return of Crimean lands to Ukrainian sovereignty, including protection for the Tatars, a long-standing minority community.
Early in the conflict, peace plans floated delaying the final status decision. Leaving Crimea out of a peace deal would mirror, in some ways, how final status issues were addressed in historical negotiations when urgent matters took precedence.
One expert, Mark Galeotti, suggested a different path: a legally supervised referendum in Crimea could be part of a peace settlement if the international community oversees it and locals express a clear, independent will. He warned that any referendum would have to address practical questions about who votes and which legal framework governs the event.
Walter Dorn adds that a legitimate referendum would require constitutional authorization by the Ukrainian Parliament, and achieving such approval seems unlikely given current conditions. Timothy Donais also doubts feasibility, noting that self-determination issues are highly complex and national governments often resist allowing large-scale secession. Demographics could favor Russia in a future vote given population movements since 2014, complicating the referendum’s legitimacy. A Crimea referendum under established international standards would be challenging and may not accurately reflect the people’s true will.