NATO’s concern about the Russian submarine fleet has grown due to its potential to target and compromise underwater infrastructure, including global internet cables and pipelines. This fear is echoed by analyses cited by Newsweek, a respected American publication, which highlights the strategic implications for Western states.
In recent years, Moscow has launched a range of submarines with the capability to affect key targets in the United States and continental Europe. As a result, NATO allies have grown increasingly anxious about the activities of Vladimir Putin’s naval forces, according to the same outlet. Newsweek notes that the Russian Navy operates one of the most adaptable submarine fleets in the world, and experts interviewed for the piece argue that in a hypothetical full-scale conflict, nuclear-powered submarines could implement broad deterrence, while conventional subs would be deployed to engage in other operational theaters.
Disruptions to underwater critical infrastructure around the globe would pose a highly serious threat, says Michael Peterson, director of RMSI, a U.S. research center that monitors Russia’s maritime capabilities. He asserts that Moscow has been strengthening its seabed warfare options for more than a decade. Much of this work is associated with the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research, commonly known by its acronym GUGI, which oversees some of the navy’s most specialized undersea tasks. Peterson points to the Belgorod, a one-of-a-kind nuclear submarine equipped with Poseidon undersea drones, as a prominent example of this capability.
Peterson stresses that several other subs could install surveillance devices or even explosive devices on undersea cables and other critical assets on the ocean floor. He is confident that GUGI possesses the skills to conduct intelligence collection, maritime operations, or high-impact actions against adversaries should the need arise.
He underscores the potential consequences of severing transatlantic internet links, noting the vast financial disruption and the breakdown of communications between the United States and Europe. He also emphasizes that maintaining submarine cables is exceptionally challenging, which would grant Moscow a significant asymmetrical advantage in deep-sea operations.
A Norwegian defense scholar, Njord Vegge of the Norwegian Defense Academy, told Newsweek that Norway has stepped up patrols in the North Sea. He connects this to the Nord Stream incident and worries about domestic pipelines. A separate American investigation has raised questions about sabotage in the Nord Stream project, which adds to regional concerns about underwater infrastructure in times of strain.
Vegge notes that the Nord Stream disruption had a major impact on European energy supply, and while Norway remains a major gas exporter, he argues that any future military conflict could render underwater facilities more vulnerable. RMSI’s Peterson adds that the primary clash in a war would likely unfold on land, yet the Russian doctrine envisions using the naval fleet to inflict maximum strategic damage, which would include submarine operations.
Peterson argues that attacks on critical infrastructure are a relatively new dimension of warfare, one where Russia has demonstrated confidence. He points to prior operations against fixed facilities using air and sea power as a precedent. He also notes that the war in Ukraine confirmed the Navy’s ability to contribute significantly to Moscow’s military objectives, reinforcing the image of a capable sea force despite losses.
Ultimately, Peterson contends that the danger posed by Russian submarines during this era rivals the risk seen in the Cold War. He suggests that nuclear submarines could patrol near the U.S. coast, the Mediterranean, and other European peripheries—an approach reminiscent of Soviet-era submarine strategy and a reminder of enduring maritime stakes in North America and beyond. The assessment reflects ongoing concerns about how undersea forces shape global security dynamics in North America and Europe.