The Moscow City Court has sentenced Ivan Safronov, an adviser to the head of Roscosmos, to 22 years in a strict-regime penal colony. After release, he will face a two-year restriction of freedom and a fine of 500 thousand rubles. Safronov denies all charges and maintains his innocence. Investigators allege he transmitted information classified as state secrets to foreign intelligence services. The case stems from Safronov’s journalistic work on arms supplies to Africa, the Middle East, and CSTO members.
“Send Safronov to 22 years in prison for serving in a strict regime colony,” stated the court’s decision.
The parties have 10 days to appeal; the ruling has not yet entered into force. Safronov’s defense has filed an appeal and intends to seek acquittal. “We immediately went to the office and filed a concise appeal,” said lawyer Daniil Nikiforov.
“Safronov received a two-year sentence that began in a pre-trial detention center. Since he has been found guilty of a particularly serious crime, he must serve at least two-thirds of the term before parole. That means parole could come around 14 years from now,” explained a representative of the justice authorities speaking to TASS.
“I love you!” Safronov told his relatives before being escorted out of the courtroom.
The case comprises two parts and has been in progress since March. The prosecutor’s office sought a sentence of 24 years in prison, a 500 thousand ruble fine, and a two-year restriction of freedom after release.
heart of matter
Safronov previously covered military and space topics for Kommersant and Vedomosti before joining Roscosmos. He was detained on 7 July 2020. The FSB has alleged that he transferred classified information on Russia’s military-technical cooperation and defense sector to NATO-related services. The defense argues that investigators suspected Safronov of working for Czech intelligence since 2012. The investigation maintains that the United States ultimately received the material.
The case centers on two strands: Safronov is accused of providing confidential data to Czech journalist Martin Larisch and German political scientist Demuri Voronin. It is alleged that Safronov supplied Larisch with military-technical information about arms supplies to Africa, the Middle East, and CSTO members for personal gain. TASS reported that Larisch was labeled as Safronov’s so-called “employee.” Safronov has repeatedly stated that his meetings with Larisch were professional and that they communicated strictly as colleagues. The Moscow City Court previously refused to compel Larisch to testify or to include Larisch’s statements in the case file, according to TASS citing a lawyer.
Voronin, as alleged by investigators, was shown as a recipient of information about Russian army activities in Syria, which was then transmitted to the University of Zurich and German intelligence. The prosecutor’s office contends that Voronin received a 248-dollar reward for this information. Voronin himself faces treason charges and is considered an agent of German intelligence. He served as a prosecution witness in the Safronov case but later testified in court that Safronov’s innocence should be affirmed by the head of Roscosmos.
According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Safronov allegedly collected classified and top-secret data between 2015 and 2019, including information on Russia’s military-technical cooperation and CSTO activity, as well as relations with Middle Eastern, African, and Balkan partners.
Safronov maintains his innocence, having rejected a plea deal twice. In his final remarks, he argued that the prosecution appeared to target him for his journalistic work, rather than for mercenary motives, and he asserted that someone transmitted data that was considered state secrets to him. He emphasized that he has never possessed state secrets nor shared them with foreign intelligence services. He also claimed that analysts misread his 2017 open-source report alongside top-secret 2018 documents and treated 2016 Arms Export material as confidential from 2017.
What could be a state secret?
The media coverage linked the case to reports about Russian Su-35 deliveries to Egypt and the deployment of aviation destruction vehicles in a March 2019 Kommersant publication. Following the article, the Egyptian Defense Attaché in Moscow contacted the Russian authorities seeking clarification. Brigadier General Mohamed Mansi asked Moscow to deny the news and take appropriate actions.
The Russian service of the BBC reported that another Egyptian Ministry of Defense official noted correspondence with Russian colleagues mentioning military-technical cooperation with Egypt. He warned that such reports could affect existing agreements and lead to adverse consequences. A few months after the publication, the article was removed from the publication’s site.
Russian media also noted that other items, such as reports on arms deliveries to Serbia and coverage by Larisch’s Center for the Analysis and Prevention of Security Threats—covering topics like arms shipments to Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the scope of the Russian military presence in Syria—could bear relevance to the case. These items appeared in Safronov’s reporting and in related materials from open sources. The exact implications remain the subject of ongoing investigation and legal argument.