On November 21, North Korea announced the launch of its first visual reconnaissance satellite, Manligyong-1. It operates in a sun-synchronous orbit, passing over the Korean Peninsula once daily at an apogee near 500 kilometers. A week after liftoff, state publications claimed the satellite captured photographs of the American White House, the Pentagon, and U.S. air bases, though the frames were not published for public view.
Shortly afterward, the North Korean Ministry of Defense warned the U.S. Space Force not to attempt interference with the satellite, arguing that such action would amount to a declaration of war.
The Ministry asserted that the aggressive stance of the U.S. Space Force toward the North Korean reconnaissance asset could not be overlooked, calling it a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the DPRK.
North Korea’s defense leadership noted that the new satellite prompted the United States to impose additional sanctions and join condemnations from Japan and the Republic of Korea. In reality, no U.S. official claimed plans to destroy Manligyong-1, and U.S. government statements on the matter echoed a cautious tone, suggesting that there would be little public impact from the launch beyond existing public-domain imagery of strategic sites.
Most analysts view the situation through a balance of deterrence and diplomacy. The United States controls a range of anti-satellite capabilities, including systems designed to target objects in low Earth orbit. However, attempting to disrupt Manligyong-1 could trigger a broad diplomatic crisis and risk broader regional instability, particularly with China. The likelihood of North Korea declaring war remains low, given Pyongyang’s strategic calculus and regional dynamics.
silent removal
The United States and other advanced economies possess additional avenues to counter satellite activity without direct destruction. Three main approaches are commonly discussed: electronic interference, targeted hacking, and adhesive optical strategies. Experts describe these options as methods to degrade or temporarily disable satellite operations while avoiding kinetic conflict.
According to Viktor Voropaev, a leading engineer with the International Network of Optical Telescopes, communications with a satellite rely on its own orbital footprint. North Korea’s satellite passes over both Koreas, creating moments when radio visibility could be exploited or jammed. History shows that one nation can influence another’s spacecraft through less aggressive means, though success depends on many technical variables and the resilience of the satellite’s design.
Jamming can impede a satellite’s ability to receive commands or downlink data by overwhelming ground receivers with noise at the intended frequency. While this approach is imperfect and sometimes detectable, it remains a practical option for creating periods of degraded performance, especially if a mission requires uninterrupted ground coordination. There are precedents, including reports of jamming affecting other geostationary or near-Earth systems in various regions.
A third tactic involves directed energy, such as a powerful laser to overwhelm a camera or sensor. If a beam strikes a camera lens with sufficient intensity, the resulting glare or damage can mask the scene, or cause irreversible harm to sensors. Experts emphasize that any such action would be difficult to conceal and could escalate into broader confrontation.
In practice, many of these techniques are both subtle and potentially untraceable by external observers. Even if a satellite experiences disruption, distinguishing deliberate interference from ordinary malfunctions can be challenging. The North Korean leadership may frame any incidents as external aggression, complicating international assessments of intent and culpability.
why pursue disruption?
Historically, states explore non-destructive avenues to contest space assets when direct confrontation seems costly or unlikely to succeed. Analysts note that the optics of such moves matter almost as much as the technical outcomes. The reliability and precision of a given satellite system come into play, along with the political cost of any action perceived as illegitimate interference.
Voropaev notes that the practical limits of a reconnaissance camera hinge on physical parameters like lens diameter. A modest lens yields a resolution adequate for identifying large structures, while higher-resolution systems require much larger optics and more complex stabilization. Comparisons with commercial imagery from private entities illustrate that the best civilian satellites can rival military assets in some scenarios, underscoring the evolving landscape of space reconnaissance.
Overall, experts suggest that while disabling a satellite is possible in theory, it is not a straightforward or universally desirable outcome. The technical challenges, risk of escalation, and the availability of alternative sources of intelligence all temper the perceived value of overt disruption.
In this context, North Korea’s latest asset represents a milestone in its space program. The lens size and orbital parameters define what can realistically be observed from Earth. The quality of imagery attainable from Manligyong-1 will influence both regional security calculations and the public narrative about North Korea’s capabilities. For perspective, the most advanced commercial satellites offer very high resolutions, setting a benchmark for government-driven systems seeking parity or strategic advantage. The broader intelligence ecosystem includes a mix of state and private sources, including operations in nearby regions that can complement or rival North Korean imagery.