The 40-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun known as the Bofors L60 was developed by AB Bofors and became a legendary, best selling weapon for the Swedish company. By 1939 the L60 was exported to 18 countries and license agreements were in place with 10 more, leading to service in over 75 nations around the world.
The AZP fires a 0.907 kg high explosive fragmentation projectile that exits the barrel at 881 m/s. In combat, the weapon weighs 1981 kg, with a barrel length of 2990 mm. Its practical ceiling sits around 3800 m, the maximum range exceeds 7160 m, and its fire rate reaches 120 rounds per minute.
Early production featured a modern aiming system for its era. Horizontal and vertical gunners used reflex sights, while a third crew member operated a mechanical calculator behind them to assist fire control.
Overall, the Bofors L60 possessed impressive tactical and technical capabilities for its time. It was widely copied and produced under license in many nations. One notable international copy is the Soviet 37 mm 61-K gun, which reflects how widely the design influenced other markets.
During World War II the Bofors L60 was regarded as the finest anti aircraft gun in use by the United States Navy. It proved highly effective against Japanese aircraft, particularly kamikaze targets. A direct hit from the 40 mm projectile could neutralize almost any aircraft used as a flying bomb.
Despite a storied combat record, the era of the Bofors L60 is now largely in the past, and there are limits to how much its use could realistically enhance current Ukrainian military capabilities.
With that in mind, it is useful to consider how the Ukrainian army might deploy the L60. This requires a careful look at how small caliber anti aircraft artillery has been used in recent conflicts and what lessons emerged from those engagements.
In the Soviet Afghan war, conflicts in Libya and Syria, anti aircraft guns were often pressed into ground target roles rather than air defense. Their high rate of fire and accuracy helped to bolster motorized units by targeting enemy firing positions, including heavy emplacements and field fortifications.
For instance, in Afghanistan Soviet troops used such guns to suppress enemy firing points perched in mountain caves or adobe structures. In other cases, the task involved destroying lightly armored ground targets. The same pattern appeared during the Libyan civil conflicts where air defense weapons were repurposed for ground effects.
There is reason to believe that similar tactics could be considered for the L60 in contemporary operations. When tasked against modern air targets, its effectiveness would depend on ammunition availability and sustained supply, which have posed questions in recent conflicts.
Even when used against ground targets, the 40 mm projectile carries limited high explosive charge, which can limit its impact on well defended positions. In past campaigns, larger caliber systems demonstrated higher efficiency for ground suppression, highlighting a gap in the comparative effectiveness of this weapon for ground support missions. This analysis remains a matter of strategic assessment rather than a statement of endorsement.
The text here reflects a broader view on the historical record and does not represent a stance endorsed by any editorial board.